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COMMENT
A QUESTION OF REMEDIABILITY:
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
FOR ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
In July, 1884, William T. Vaughn, a public school teacher, was arrested
on a charge of assault with intent to commit rape. 1 Although he was acquit-
ted of the charge, the local school board cancelled his teaching contract for
that fall. Vaughn sued, but the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District
upheld the board's action, basing its decision on a finding that knowledge of
Vaughn's actions had become widespread. 2
Today, the more than 1,0003 school boards 4 in Illinois can dismiss any of
the state's approximately 100,000 5 full-time teachers for any of a variety of
reasons. During the past several years, however, the dismissal procedure has
become increasingly complex and confusing 6 as the Illinois Legislature
and courts have promulgated four statutes 7 and a maze of conflicting case
1. Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 II1. App. 347 (4th Dist. 1885).
2. Id. at 348. The court justified its decision to affirm the dismissal by stating that Vaughn
lacked the "innate virtue and morality that the law contemplates should be, and parents have a
right to expect are, possessed by" teachers. Id. at 349-50.
3. The most recently published figure is 1,025 operating school districts as of fall, 1977.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1979, at 60
(1979) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST].
4. A board of education is an agency of the state, created by statute, which is directly
responsible for the management of a local district. See McCurdy v. Board of Educ.
(Bloomington), 359 I1l. 188, 194 N.E. 287 (1934).
5. See DIGEST, supra note 3, at 53, which estimates the figure to be 107,000. Public,
full-time teachers, and part-time teachers are included in the figure as full-time equivalents. Id.
In this Comment, the term "dismissal" means "termination for cause of a non-tenured
teacher's employment during the contractual period and the termination of a tenured teacher's
employment at any time." Jacobsen, Sperry & Jensen, The Dismissal and Non-Reemployment of
Teachers, 1 J. L. & EDUC. 435, 435 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Jacobsen]. Dismissal can also
refer to termination for honorable causes, such as financial exigencies. The term "teacher" refers
to "any and all district employees required to be certified under the laws relating to the certifi-
cation of teachers. Lester v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 119, Jo Daviess County), 87 Ill. App. 2d
269, 279-80, 230 N.E.2d 893, 898 (2d Dist. 1967). See also McNely v. Board of Educ. (Dist.
No. 7, Macoupin County), 9 I11. 2d 143, 149, 137 N.E.2d 63, 66-67 (1956).
6. Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 435.
7. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-22.4, 24-11, -12 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §
34-85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). Sections 10-22.4, 24-11, and 24-12 apply to municipalities with
a population of less than 500,000. Section 34-85 applies to municipalities with a population over
500,000, that is, Chicago. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Board of Educ. (Chicago), 14 I11. App.
3d 154, 301 N.E.2d 833 (1st Dist. 1973).
Section 10-22.4 provides as follows:
Dismissal of teachers. To dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty, negligence,
immorality or other sufficient cause and to dismiss any teacher, whenever, in its
opinion, he is not qualified to teach, or whenever, in its opinion, the interests of
the schools require it, subject, however, to the provisions of Sections 24-10 to
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law 8 in an attempt to balance the conflicting interests of school boards and
teachers. 9  School boards, accountable to the communities they serve, 1 0
mnst provide the best possible educational system for their students. Al-
though teachers share this general goal, their professional reputations and
source of livelihood are at stake whenever a school board seeks to dismiss a
teacher. Consequently, teachers desire to protect their jobs against arbitrary
and unfair actions by boards. "
During the dismissal process, all interested parties focus their concern on
a teacher's conduct. If the conduct is remediable, 12 the Illinois School Code
requires that a teacher be served with a warning notice and granted an op-
portunity to correct the deficient conduct. 13 If, however, the conduct is
irremediable, or if a teacher fails to remediate deficient conduct after receiv-
ing a warning notice, a school board can remove the teacher by issuing a
notice of dismissal. 14 After serving a notice of dismissal, a school board
must schedule a hearing to be held by an independent hearing officer
employed by the Illinois State Board of Education.15 Thereafter, a party
24-15, inclusive. Temporary mental or physical incapacity to perform teaching
duties, as found by a medical examination, is not a cause for dismissal. Marriage is
not a cause of removal.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977).
8. Kelleghan, The 'Guiding Star' in Teacher Dismissals, 52 ILL. B.J. 422, 425 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Kelleghan]. The author states that the "leading cases demonstrate an inability to
agree on what is a 'remediable' cause for purposes of notice of dismissal under the Tenure Act,"
because "the statute is itself intrinsically unsusceptible to any test other than purely subjective
opinion." Id.
9. Jacobsen, supra note 5, at 435. See Danville Community Consol. School Dist. No. 118
v. Moutray (Aug. 26, 1976) (Adelman, H.O.). The hearing officer in Danville stated that "[tihere
are always underlying and inherent questions of balancing of respective rights-that of a school
board and its responsibilities to educate the students of the district by the placement of compe-
tent teachers and the inherent right of the teacher to be protected in the position. Id. at 8. See
generally Comment, Teacher Dismissal Legislation: The Nevada Approach, 6 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 112 (1968).
10. J. SAYLOR & W. ALEXANDER, PLANNING CURRICULUM FOR SCHOOLs 283-85 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as SAYLOR & ALEXANDER].
11. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 118) v. Norris, at 5 (Feb. 23, 1977) (Davidson, H.O.), aff'd
No. 77-MR-54 (Vermillion County Cir. Ct., March 15, 1977).
12. This term of art refers to the ability of a teacher to relieve or cure his or her conduct,
i.e., to bring the conduct to a level considered by a board of education to be appropriate. Thus,
if conduct is irremediable, damage has been done that cannot be repaired or corrected. Grissom
v. Board of Educ. (Buckley-Loda Dist. No. 8), 75 1II. 2d 314, 331-32, 388 N.E.2d 398, 405
(1979).
13. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977); ILL. ANN, STAT. ch. 122, § 34-85 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979).
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977).
15. Id.
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may appeal a hearing officer's decision to the Illinois circuit courts, pursuant
to the Administative Review Act. 6
Upon review, a court asks: (a) Was the teacher protected by due process
procedures during the dismissal procedures? (b) Did the school board cor-
rectly characterize the allegedly deficient conduct as remediable or irremed-
iable? 1 7 Illinois' courts have not clearly defined either the standards of con-
duct or the factors that boards, hearing officers, and courts should consider
when determining whether a teacher should be dismissed. Furthermore, Il-
linois hearing officers and courts should consider private sector labor law
factors relevant to the surrounding circumstances in which the alleged
deficient conduct occurred.
This Comment examines the question of remediability as addressed in
hearing officer and court decisions. The various factors involved in a teacher's
dismissal are explored and nine general categories of teacher conduct that
may result in dismissal proceedings are delineated. 18 Within each category,
current and proposed standards for determining whether deficient conduct is
remediable or irremediable are detailed, and examples from hearing officer
and court cases are discussed. In addition, the types of evidence necessary
to sustain a school board's decision to dismiss a teacher are considered.
Throughout these discussions, the goals are to set forth the guidelines for
teacher conduct that have emerged from dismissal proceedings, to highlight
the unanswered questions that require resolution by the Illinois General As-
sembly and courts, and to consider the proper roles of the General Assem-
bly, local school boards, and judicial system in teacher dismissals.
DISMISSAL PROCEDURE: AN OVERVIEW
A. A Grant of Tenure and a School Board's Actions
Section 10-22.4 of the Illinois School Code grants a school board the
power to dismiss a teacher,1 9 subject only to limitation by the Teacher Ten-
ure Act. 20  This Act delineates the process of obtaining contractual con-
16. Id. §§ 2.4-12, -16 (1977). See Administrative Review Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §
264-279 (1977).
17. This Comment focuses on the standards of remediability and irremediability. Although
due process requirements are not analyzed, see note 77 infra for a digest of leading cases in
that area.
18. See text at pages 536-52. The nine categories are (1) incompetency; (2) improper disci-
plinary techniques; (3) personal misconduct; (4) insubordination; (5) violation of school rules; (6)
teacher absences; (7) inadequate teaching qualifications; (8) dismissal in the best interest of the
school; and (9) miscellaneous.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See note 7 supra.
20. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-11 to 24-15 (1977). See Wesclin Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ. (Wesclin Dist. No. 3), 30 Ill. App. 3d 67, 75, 331 N.E.2d 335, 340 (5th Dist. 1975).
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tinued service (tenure) 21 and assures that the dismissal of a tenured teacher
will be based on cause 22 rather than partisanship or caprice.2 3  Section 24-
21. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1977).
22. "Cause" was defined in Jepsen v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 307, Kankakee County), 19
I11. App. 2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (2d Dist. 1958), as "some substantial shortcoming which
renders continuance in . . . office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and
efficiency of the service and something which the law and a sound public opinion recognize as
good cause for his no longer occupying the place." Id. at 207, 153 N.E.2d at 419, quoting
Murphy v. Houston, 250 I11. App. 385, 394 (1st Dist. 1928). In Sausbier v. Wheeler, 252 App.
Div. 267, 299 N.Y.S. 466 (3d Dep't 1937), the court asserted that cause "must be one which
specifically relates to and affects the administration of the office, . . . must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interest of the public . . . and
must be one touching the qualifications of the officer or his performance of his duties." Id. at
270-71, 299 N.Y.S. at 472.
Although the Teacher Tenure Act clearly applies to dismissals, a current controversy is
whether the due process requirements of section 24-12 apply with equal force to suspensions. A
conflict on this issue currently exists between two districts of the Illinois Appellate Court. In
Caviness v. Board of Educ. (Ludlow Dist. No. 142), 59 Ill. App. 3d 28, 375 N.E.2d 157 (4th
Dist. 1978), the court, referring to the purpose of the Teacher Tenure Act, ruled that the
"words 'removed' or 'dismissed,' ... must encompass any reduction in the extent of employ-
ment," including suspensions. Id. at 30-31, 375 N.E.2d at 158 (emphasis in original).
The Third District Appellate Court agreed. Craddock v. Board of Educ. (Annawan Dist. No.
226), 76 I11. App. 3d 43, 391 N.E.2d 1059 (3d Dist. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 52415 (111. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 29, 1979). In Craddock, because the board did not comply with the procedures set
forth in section 24-12, the court affirmed summary judgment for the teacher, thus invalidating a
three-day suspension for calling a student a "son of a bitch." Id. at 46, 391 N.E.2d at 1061.
Justice Alloy dissented, noting that sections 10-22.4 and 24-12 do not expressly mention suspen-
sion and that although the "complex and costly procedures" of a hearing before an impartial
hearing officer "make sense" for a dismissal, they "border on the ridiculous" for temporary
discipline. Id. at 48, 391 N.E.2d at 1063 (Alloy, J., dissenting).
Specifically adopting Alloy's dissent, the First District Appellate Court upheld a teacher's
suspension in a similar situation. Kearns v. Board of Educ. (N. Palos Dist. No. 117), 73 Ill. App.
3d 907, 392 N.E.2d 148 (1st Dist. 1979). The court stated that the teacher was not entitled to
the procedural requirements of section 24-12. Id. at 912, 392 N.E.2d at 152. As support, the
court also cited Englebrecht v. Hudson, No. 77-C-429 (N.D. Ill. March 17, 1979) (memoran-
dum opinion and order), which ruled that the procedural requirements were not required.
Nevertheless, the Craddock court, in a supplemental opinion denying a motion for a rehearing,
specifically disagreed with the United States District Court and reaffirmed its decision. 76 I11.
App. 3d at 52, 391 N.E.2d at 1066. The conflict may be resolved when the Illinois Supreme
Court issues its opinion in the Craddock case.
23. Donahoo v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 303, Moultrie County), 413 II1. 422, 109 N.E.2d
787 (1952). The court stated that the purpose of the Teacher Tenure Act was "to improve the
Illinois school system by assuring teachers of experience and ability a continuous service and a
rehiring based upon merit rather than failure to rehire upon reasons that are political, partisan
or capricious." Id. at 425, 109 N.E.2d at 789. Accord, Caviness v. Board of Educ., 59 II1. App.
3d at 31, 375 N.E.2d at 158 (affirmed order that tenured teacher be reassigned to a full-time
teaching position because the Act protects teachers "against capricious, fickle and irregular
exploits of school boards"); Relph v. Board of Educ. (DePue Dist. No. 103), 51 111. App. 3d
1036, 1039-40, 366 N.E.2d 1125, 1127-28 (3d Dist. 1977) (discharged teacher entitled to
employment in a position created within one vear of discharge); Kallas v. Board of Educ. (Mar-
shall Dist. No. C-2), 15 Ill. App. 3d 450, 454, 304 N.E.2d 527, 529-30 (4th Dist. 1973) (affirmed
dismissal of teacher, although the court recognized "that the Teacher Tenure Law has as its
benign purpose job security for worthy teachers and serves as a protective shield against dismis-
sal for trivial, political, capricious or arbitrary causes"); Miller v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 132,
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12's due process requirements, 24 which are triggered when a teacher ac-
quires tenure under the provisions of section 24-11,25 do not apply to non-
tenured, probationary teachers. 26  During probation, a board can dismiss a
teacher for any constitutionally permissible reason, 27 unless the dismissal
will affect the teacher's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. 28 In
Cook County), 51 111. App. 2d 20, 28, 200 N.E.2d 838, 842 (1st Dist. 1964) (Teacher Tenure Act
protects teachers who serve "'at the mercy of the school boards"). See generally Kelleghan,
supra note 8; Legislative Development, Teacher Dismissal Legislation: The Nevada Approach, 6
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 112, 121 (1968). The author stated that tenure provisions insulate teachers
from politics, i.e., parental control over the schools. According to the author, the provisions
lead to mistrust by parents and students as their control over their community schools is de-
creased. Id.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977).
25. Id. § 24-11.
26. See, e.g., Titchener v. Avery Coonley School, 39 Il. App. 3d 871, 350 N.E.2d 502 (2d
Dist. 1976) (no due process guarantee of procedural rights of a hearing for the nonrenewal of a
contract during probation); Wesclin Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 30 Ill. App. 3d 67, 331
N.E.2d 335 (5th Dist. 1975) (the only statutory requirements for probationary teachers are dis-
missal for one of the statutory grounds and written notice at least 60 days before the end of the
school term).
A probationary teacher has the "least amount of protection," and a school board has the
maximum amount of flexibility" in dismissing such a teacher. Rockford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ. (Dist. No. 205, Winnebago County), 11 111. App. 3d 78, 80, 296 N.E.2d 100, 102 (2d
Dist. 1973). Finally, section 24-12 explicitly states that it applies only to tenured teachers.
Section 24-11 of the Illinois School Code creates three types of teachers-first-year probation-
ary teachers, second-year probationary teachers, and tenured teachers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
122, § 24-11 (1977). To dismiss a first-year probationary teacher, a board must send the teacher
written notice at least 60 days before the end of the school year. A board need not give reasons
for dismissal. Id. To dismiss a second-year probationary teacher, a board mtist specify the
reasons for dismissal in the written notice. ld. At the end of the second year, however, a board
can, under certain circumstances, extend a teacher's probation to a third year by giving notice
of extension and stating the reasons for the action and the corrective measures required of the
teacher to enter into tenured status at the end of the third year. See Graham v. Board of Educ.
(Dist. No. 77, St. Clair County), 15 I11. App. 3d 1092, 305 N.E.2d 310 (5th Dist. 1973). The
Grahami court stated that "the General Assembly did not intend for the optional third year of
probation to be required for all new teachers," and that the "Board's policy of automatic exten-
sion of the probationary period is contrary to the intent of Section 24-11." Id. at 1098, 305
N.E.2d at 315. But see Donahoo v. Board of Educ., 413 II1. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1952) (section
24-11's language is mandator%, and teacher acquired tenure by completing the two-vear period).
Accord, Bessler v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 150, Peoria County), 69 III. 2d 191, 197, 370
N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (1977); Brunstrom v. Board of Educ. (Riverside Dist. No. 100), 52 1ll. App.
3d 653, 658, 367 N.E.2d 1065, 1066-67 (3d Dist. 1977).
The grant of tenure, however, is not de facto, because the legislature intended to provide a
second-year probationary teacher who showed promise an extra chance to meet the standards of
tenure. Jackson v. Board of Educ. (Trico Dist. No. 176), 63 I11. App. 3d 671, 675, 380 N.E.2d
41, 45 (5th Dist. 1978).
27. For example, a Board cannot dismiss a teacher for exercising constitutionally guaranteed
rights, but can dismiss a teacher for any other reasons. Miller v. School Dist. No. 167 (Cook
County), 500 F.2d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1974); Newborn v. Morrison, 400 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Ill.
1977).
28. Burns v. Board of Educ. (Fairfield Dist. No. 112), 47 II1. App. 3d 589, 593, 362 N.E.2d
353, 356 (5th Dist. 1977). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Wisconsin v.
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these cases, procedural due process is required before a dismissal is constitu-
tionally valid. 29 A teacher who is not dismissed at the end of the probation-
ary period automatically becomes tenured, 30 acquires a property interest in
the teaching position, 3 1 and is legitimately entitled to the procedural clue
process protections of section 24-12.32
Pursuant to section 24-12, a school board's first task is to characterize a
teacher's allegedly deficient conduct as remediable or irremediable. If the
conduct is remediable, a board issues and serves upon a teacher a notice to
remedy, or, in the language of the statute, a "reasonable warning in writing,
stating specifically the causes [i.e., deficient conduct] which, if not removed,
may result in charges" of dismissal. 33 After specifically detailing the charges
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Austin v. Board of Educ. (Georgetown Dist. No. 3),
562 F.2d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1977). In Austin, the court stated that a hearing is required to allow
a non-tenured teacher the opportunity to clear his or her name when a school board has created
and disseminated a false and defamatory impression about the dismissal. 1d.
29. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court stated that "where a person's
good name, reputation, or integrity is at stake, because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 573.
30. Graham v. Board of' Educ., 15 II1. App. 3d at 1098, 305 N.E.2d at 315.
31. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-72. See generally Comment, An Illinois
Teacher's Right to Retention, 48 Cni.-KENr L. REV. 80 (1971).
32. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. See Barszcz v. Board of Trustees (Commun-
ity College Dist. No. 504), 400 F. Snpp. 675, 677 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 1080 (1976).
The Roth decision and other similar cases on the rights of probationary teachers have been
the subject of much academic discussion. See generally Griffis & Wilson, Constitutional Rights
and Remedies in the Non-Renewal of a Public School Teacher's Employment Contract, 25
BAYLOR L. REV. 549 (1973); Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does the Nontenured Teacher Have a
Constitutional Right to a Hearing Before Noireneival?, 61 ILL. B.J. 464 (1973); Spak, A Survey
of Constitutional Laiw, 50 Ciii.-KEN'r L. REv. 248 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law-
Procedural Due Process-The Rights of a Non-Tenured Teacher Upon Non-Reneiwal of His
Contract at a State School, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 702 (1973); Note, Iowa Public School Teachers:
Procedural Due Process Requiremnents for Contract Tertnination, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 121 (1978);
Note, School Law-Nonrenewial of Nontenured Teacher's Contract-Procedural Due Process, 5
N. KY. L. REv. 141 (1978); Note, The Due Process Rights of Public Employees, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 310 (1975).
33. ILL. REV. SiAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977). Accord, Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 111. App.
2d at 28, 200 N.E.2d at 842. The court stated that "before serving notice of such charges, [the
board] must give the teacher a written warning notice, stating with particularity the causes
which, if not removed, may result in the bringing of dismissal charges." Id. The court also
advised that a board "put itself on record." ld. at 30, 200 N.E.2d at 843. Accord, Yesinowski v.
Board of Educ. (Byron Dist. No. 226), 28 Ill. App. 3d 119, 123, 328 N.E.2d 23, 27 (1975).
Applying this rule of law to charges in a notice to remedy or a notice of dismissal, an appel-
late court found vague the charge of "[lailure to effectively perform and carry out your instruc-
tional duties." Hutchison v. Board of Educ. (Greenfield Dist. No. 10), 32 I11. App. 2d 247, 250,
177 N.E.2d 420, 423 (3d Dist. 1961). In addition, the charge that the best interest of the
schools require a teacher's dismissal has also been found to be insufficient. Wells v. Board of
Educ. (Dist. No. 64, Cook County), 85 I11. App. 2d 312, 318-19, 230 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1st Dist.
1967). Cf. Keyes v. Board of Educ. (Maroa Dist. No. 2), 20 III. App. 2d 504, 512-13, 156
N.E.2d 763, 766-67 (3d Dist. 1959) (affirmed dismissal of superintendent, finding that he par-
ticipated in fomenting controversies, conflicts, and dissension in the school district).
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against a teacher, the notice advises a teacher to correct specific deficien-
cies, 34 so that a reviewing court can pass judgment on a board's characteriza-
tion of the conduct. 3  Therefore, if a board characterizes remediable con-
duct as irremediable and fails to issue a warning notice, it lacks jurisdiction
to dismiss the teacher.36 The dismissal is void, and the teacher will be
reinstated or receive other relief. 37
Because a warning notice is required for remediable causes, a teacher
must have a reasonable time and opportunity to confront and correct the
alleged deficient conduct. '8 Fairness dictates that a board first should calcu-
late the necessary period of remediation, then gauge the probable speed of
remediation and, after a reasonable period of time, determine the likelihood
of a teacher's total remediation. Illinois courts have yet to determine the
length of a "reasonable" period of time. The duration of this period should
depend on the type of conduct involved. For example, a teacher may need
more time to correct incompetent teaching methods than to correct a lack of
cooperation with fellow teachers and administrators. 39 Additionally, a
teacher's awareness of the problems, 40 the specific circumstances of the al-
leged deficient conduct, 41 a teacher's personality, 42 and the length of a
34. Keyes v. Board of Educ., 20 I11. App. 2d at 508, 156 N.E.2d at 766.
35. Yesinowski v. Board of Educ., 28 Ill. App. 3d at 123, 328 N.E.2d at 26-27.
36. Grissom v. Board of Educ. 75 I11. 2d at 333, 388 N.E.2d at 406. See Paprocki v. Board
of Educ. (McHenry Dist. No. 156), 31 111. App. 3d 112, 114, 334 N.E.2d 841, 844 (2d Dist.
1975) (reversed dismissal because the causes were remediable at one time but the board lacked
jurisdiction because it failed to send warning notice).
This ruling may apply only to school boards falling tinder section 24-12. As a hearing officer
explained, section 24-12's requirements apply to small school districts, where a board can give
the warning notice. When considering Chicago, however, the legislature recognized the imprac-
ticality of the board giving the warning notice and intended that it be given by supervisory
officials. Carter v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., at 8 (April 17, 1979) (Wilson, H.O.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-L-10752 (Cook County Cir. Ct. May 18, 1979). The Illinois School Code contains a set of
provisions that apply just to the City of Chicago. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 34-1 to
34-127 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-128 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
37. Paprocki v. Board of Educ., 31 111. App. 3d at 115, 334 N.E.2d at 844. See Waller v.
Board of Edic. (Century Dist. No. 100, Pulaski County), 13 111. App. 3d 1056, 302 N.E.2d 190
(5th Dist. 1973).
38. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 I11. 2d at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 406. See Welch v. Board of
Educ. (Bement Dist. No. 5), 45 II1. App. 3d 34, 38, 358 N.E.2d 1364, 1367 (4th Dist. 1977);
Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 11. App. 2d at 28, 200 N.E.2d at 842.
39. To correct a charge of incompetency, a teacher will have to learn and implement new
and better teaching techniques. The teacher will also need training and guidance in proper
planning and classroom instruction. To correct a charge of lack of cooperation, however, less
time is necessary; the teacher need only change his or her attitude.
40. Danville Community Consol. School Dist. No. 118 v. Moutray (Aug. 26, 1976) (Adel-
man, H.O.).
41. Freeburg Consol. School v. Graham (Aug. 3, 1976) (Forman, H.O.). The hearing officer
ruled that 23 days was insufficient to complete training in a new subject area. Id. at 5.
42. Granite City Community Unit School Dist. No. 9 v. Lakin (Aug. 25, 1976) (Adelman,
H.O.). The hearing officer stated that Lakin "cares about her profession and cares for her chil-
dren." Id. at 6.
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teacher's employment 43 should be examined as part of the surrounding cir-
cumstances.
If a teacher does not correct the alleged deficient conduct within a reason-
able period after receiving a warning notice, 44 or if the conduct was origi-
nally irremediable, a board can move to dismiss a teacher by issuing and
serving upon a teacher a notice of dismissal 45 containing specific charges and
a bill of particulars. 46  Only a school board can take this action; 47 it cannot
be delegated to a third person.aS
B. The Tests of Irretnediability
A board's most important task is to characterize allegedly deficient conduct
as remediable or irremediable. The Illinois Supreme Court has formulated
three general criteria that hearing officers and courts must consider in de-
termining the correctness of a board's decision. First, hearing officers and
courts consider whether damage was done to the students, faculty, or school,
and whether the conduct causing the damage could have been corrected if
43. Board of Educ. (Waltonville Dist. No. 1) v. Hart (Jan, 9, 1979) (Schelthoff, H.O.). The
hearing officer ruled that 53 days was insufficient to remediate the deficiencies in light of the
testimony and the length of the teacher's employment. 1d. at 2. See F. ELKOURI & E. EL-
KOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRds (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ELKOURI & ELKOURI].
The authors state that "[slonie consideration generally is given to the past record of any disci-
plined or discharged employee. An offense may be mitigated by a good past record and it may
be aggravated by a poor one." Id. at 638.
44. See Paprocki v. Board of Educ., 31 Ill. App. 3(1 112, 334 N.E.2d 841 (2d Dist. 1975)
(failure to correct remedial gromds, after a warning notice was given, justified dismissal).
45. Welch v. Board of Educ., 45 I11. App. 3d at 38, 358 N.E.2d at 1366. See Miller v.
Board of Educ., 51 I11. App. 2d at 30, 200 N.E.2d at 843. In Miller, the court ruled that if a
board dismisses a teacher without a warning notice, the courts will infer that the board "deter-
mined that the charges were irremediable." Id.
46. ILL. RE'. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977).
47. Paprocki v. Board of Educ., 31 Ill. App. 3d at 114-15, 334 N.E.2d at 843-44, qtoting
Stroh v. Casner, 201 I11. App. 281, 286 (3(d Dist. 1916). The court in Stroh stated that the
"discretionary powers should be exercised by those who have been chosen by the people as
members of these respective boards . . . and not by such persons and others jointly." 201 I11.
App. at 286. See Illinois Educ. Ass'n Local Community High School Dist. 218 v. Board of
Educ. (Dist. No. 218, Cook County), 23 111. App. 3d 649, 320 N.E.2d 240 (1st Dist. 1974);
Board of Educ. (S. Stickney Dist. 111), v. Johnson, 21 I11. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (lst
Dist. 1974).
48. Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 Ill. App. 2(1 at 319-20, 230 N.E.2d at 11. Accord, Class-
room Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ. (United Dist. No. 30, East Moline), 15 III. App. 3d 224,
304 N.E.2d 516 (3d Dist. 1973). The court stated that "a public employer such as a board of
education, in the absence of a statute, cannot negotiate a collective bargaining agreement which
involves a surrender of its legal discretion." Id. at 227, 304 N.E.2d at 519. See also Litin v.
Board of Educ. (Chicago), 72 I11. App. 3d 889, 893, 391 N.E.2d 62, 65 (1st Dist. 1979), appeal
denied, No. 52294 (I11. S. Ct. Nov. 13, 1979). The court in Litin applied this ruling to section
34-85, which covers dismissals in municipalities with populations over 500,000 and stated that
only the board can determine whether the causes are remediable and, if they are remediable,
serve the required warning notice, Id.
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the teacher had been warned by his or her superiors .4 A second criterion
is whether causes that originally were remediable became irremediable by
continuing over a long period of time .50 Finally, a hearing officer or court
considers whether individually remediable causes became irremediable be-
cause they existed in combination with other causes for dismissal.
51
The first test used to identify irremediable conduct is two-pronged. Not
only must a school board demonstrate that the students, faculty, or school
suffered damage, 52 but it also must show that the teacher could not have cor-
rected the deficient conduct if he or she had been warned. 53 The degree of
required damage is damage that is so severe as to justify dismissal absent
service of a warning notice. 54 In other words, the damage is so severe that
the deficient conduct is originally irremediable in nature. This is a high
standard, a standard that is higher than that for remediable conduct that
becomes irremediable because a teacher fails to remedy deficient conduct
specified in a warning notice. Consequently, school boards must realize that
they must meet a heavy burden of proof to establish the conduct's ir-
remediability. Although hearing officers and courts will define the parame-
ters of this standard on a case-by-case basis, school boards must now weigh
carefully a decision to dismiss a teacher without serving a warning notice and
without affording the teacher an opportunity to remedy the deficient con-
duct.
At least one appellate court has further limited the amount of required
damage by suggesting that hearing officers and courts also should consider
whether the evidence of damage relates merely to isolated incidents. 55 De-
ficient conduct may occur only once or twice during an entire school year.
Viewed in the context of a teacher's entire employment history, therefore, a
hearing officer or court may determine that the damage was not severe and
that a decision to reverse the dismissal may be equitable and reasonable.
A teacher's receptiveness to a superior's instructions and suggestions may
indicate the rernediability of a teacher's conduct. 56 If a teacher does not
49. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 I11. 2d at 331, 388 N.E.2d at 405, quoting Gilliland v.
Board of Educ. (Pleasant View Dist. No. 622), 67 Ill. 2d 113, 153, 365 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1977).
50. Id.
51. Gilliland v. Board of Ednc., 67 11. 2d at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 327. In Gilliland, the
parties dehated whether certain causes were per se remediable or irremediable. The appellee
listed thirty different behaviors asserted as per se remediable. Brief for Appellee at 42-44.
52. Fender v. School Dist. No. 25 (Arlington Heights), 37 Il1. App. 3d 736, 742, 347
N.E.2d 270, 275 (1st Dist. 1976). See Rolando v. School Directors (Dist. No. 125, LaSalle
Coun'ty), 44 I11. App. 3d 658, 358 N.E.2d 945 (3d Dist. 1976); Yesinowski v. Board of Educ., 28
I11. App. 3d 119, 328 N.E.2d 23 (2d Dist. 1975).
53. Fender v. School Dist. No. 25, 37 I11. App. 3d at 742, 347 N.E.2d at 275. See Gilliland
v. Board of Educ., 67 I11. 2d at 153 365 N.E.2d at 326; Yesinowski v. Board of Educ., 28 Ill.
App. 3d at 123, 328 N.E.2d at 26-27; Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 I11. App. 2d at 315-16, 230
N.E.2d at 8.
54. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 I11. 2d at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 405.
55. Allione v. Board of Educ. (South Fork Dist. No. 310), 29 I11. App. 2d 261, 268, 173
N.E.2d 13, 17 (3d Dist. 1961).
56. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 I11. 2d at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 406.
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cooperate with his or her superiors, or if a warning notice would be futile,
the conduct will be considered irremediable.5 7  Additionally, hearing offi-
cers and courts should examine the surrounding circumstances. Thus, as one
appellate court noted, the evidence supporting a dismissal should show that
a teacher's superiors complained to the teacher and demanded changes or
that the teacher would not have corrected the deficient conduct even if
warned. .5
The second test focuses on the length of tine during which remediable
conduct continues. Illinois courts have reasoned that remediable causes that
continue for a long period of time may become irremediable and that any
efforts to correct them would therefore be futile.59 Aside from this general
statement, however, Illinois courts have not set the parameters of this test.
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has found that problems occurring
within one academic year are remediable, 60 but that conduct extending over
a period of four years is irremediable. 6 1 Similarly, the Illinois Appellate
57. Id. at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 406. See Werner v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 4
(Marshall County), 40 Ill. App. 2d 491, 498-99, 190 N.E.2d 184, 186 (2d Dist. 1963). Accord,
Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 111. App. 2d at 322, 230 N.E.2d at 11. The Wells court stated that
there was
no evidence in the record that the [teacher] could not have corrected her teaching
program and changed its orientation if her superiors had given her a firm program
and demanded that she adopt it. Nothing suggests that, had she been warned that
her refusal or failure to do so might result in charges, her compliance would not
have been complete. . . . Consequently, it would seem that the modification of
[her] teaching program would not have had to be so extensive that it can be said
that she would be unwilling to undertake it.
I.
58. Werner v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 4, 40 Ill. App. 2d at 499, 190 N.E.2d at
186.
59. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 I11. 2d at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 504. In Robinson v. Com-
munity Unit School Dist. N6. 7 (Madison County), 35 I11. App. 2d 325, 182 N.E.2d 770 (4th
Dist. 1962), the court found a "feeling of futility in extending any efforts towards having a spirit
of cooperation." Id. at 332, 182 N.E.2d at 774. In Glover v. Board of Educ. (Macon Dist. No.
5), 21 111. App. 3d 1053, 316 N.E.2d 534 (4th Dist. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 62 Ill. 2d
122, 340 N.E.2d 4 (1976), the court ruled that the remediable causes became irremediable
because "the teacher refuses or fails to remedy them." Id. at 1057, 316 N.E.2d at 537. And, in
McLain v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 52, Carmi), 36 Ill. App. 2d 143, 183 N.E.2d 7 (4th Dist.
1962), the court found that "even though separate items may appear remediable, when the
teacher for more than a year repeatedly refuses to accept any recommendation, and persists in
all her rigid ways, there must come a time when they can no longer be regarded as remediable,
being apparently a character defect." Id. at 147, 183 N.E.2d at 9.
60. See Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 Ill. 2d at 333, 388 N.E.2d at 406. The court found
that "the [teacher's] problems arose only after the academic year started[; h]is dismissal, without
the required warning, after several months is clearly distinguishable from Gilliland." Id.
61. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 Ill. 2d at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 326. The court found that
"[t]here was evidence that the complained-of conduct of the teacher extended over a period of
four school years despite numerous parental complaints culminating in discussions between
plaintiff and her superiors concerning her conduct." Id.
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Court has found conduct continuing for longer than one year to be irreme-
diable.6 2
This lack of clarity is worthwhile; Illinois courts should not establish the
exact number of years beyond which conduct becomes irremediable. As the
Illinois Supreme Court has ruled, length alone is insufficient to transform
remediable causes into irremediable ones, particularly where a board has
"sat idly by," allowing remediable causes to become irremediable. 63 School
officials cannot disregard their own responsibility to warn a teacher of defi-
cient, remediable conduct and then suddenly notice the deficiencies after
they have become irremediable. 64 If this practice were permitted, a board
could evade the requirements of a warning notice and dismiss a teacher for
irremediable conduct simply by its own inaction. Rather, a school board has
an obligation to investigate its teachers' conduct and, where remediable, to
serve a teacher with a warning notice.
Finally, the third test requires a consideration of the cumulative effect of
the charges. 65 For example, in some cases, individual conduct standing
alone may be remediable. Damage is not severe, and the deficient conduct
is correctable. When an individual cause appears in combination with other
causes, however, the situation changes. A teacher may have a more difficult
task correcting these deficiencies, and the cumulative damage from all of the
deficiencies may be severe enough to substantiate a finding of irremediabil-
ity. 6 6
In sum, in developing general standards for characterizing conduct as ir-
remediable or remediable, the trend appears to be to consider the context of
the alleged deficiencies. Although this process may be burdensome to the
courts and confusing to the parties involved, each particular teacher's
62. See Kallas v. Board of Educ., 15 Ill. App. 3d 450, 304 N.E.2d 527 (4th Dist. 1973). The
Kallas court stated that temper outbursts cannot "remain remediable forever as a bar to the
discharge of a teacher." Id. at 452, 304 N.E.2d at 528. As the court concluded, the Teacher
Tenure Act "was not intended to lock a teacher into a school system where efforts over a period
of years by the administration to help the teacher in remedial causes fails." Id. at 454, 304
N.E.2d at 530. See also Robinson v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 7, 35 Ill. App. 2d at
330, 182 N.E.2d at 773. The court in Robinson found that an "atmosphere of unpleasantness
* . . had been growing for a number of years and reached a point where it could reasonably be
said to no longer be remedial in nature." Id. Accord, Keyes v. Board of Educ., 20 11. App. 2d at
512-13, 156 N.E.2d at 767-68. The Keyes court ruled that the "situation prevailed for several
years and although plaintiff must have been aware thereof, the record indicates no effort on his
part to remedy the same." Id.
63. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 Ill. 2d at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 327.
64. Id. See, e.g., Allione v. Board of Educ., 29 I11. App. 2d at 268, 173 N.E.2d at 17. The
court questioned how such "bad" conduct "could have escaped the Board's attention," if, in-
deed, it had lasted for a long period of time. Id. Accord, Paprocki v. Board of Educ., 31 II.
App. 3d at 114, 334 N.E.2d at 844. In Paprocki, the court ruled that a board's failure to send a
warning notice could not allow it to "later determine that once-remediable causes had become
grounds" for dismissal. Id. The court reasoned that to so hold would permit boards a method,
"through the simple passage of time," to avoid the requirements of notice as mandated in
section 24-12. Id.
65. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 111. 2d at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 326.
66. Id. at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 327.
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strengths and weaknesses are weighed against general rules established by
the courts or the General Assembly. Due to the individualized nature of the
teaching process and the unique problems faced by individual teachers and
school boards, such vague standards are not only appropriate but also essen-
tial. They allow courts to consider all of the evidence, to judge the teacher's
performance in the context of the school's environment, and then to reach
the best decision for that particular teacher and school board.
C. The Roles of Hearing Officers and Courts
In general, the Teacher Tenure Act protects teachers from a school
board's abuse of discretion. A board cannot act arbitrarily, unreasonably,
capriciously, or through fraud, corruption, oppression, or gross injustice. 67
Specifically, sections 24-12 and 34-85 establish a two-step judicial review
mechanism to check and balance a board's power to dismiss a teacher. 68
Unless a teacher requests that no hearing be scheduled, a board must
schedule a hearing before a hearing officer when it votes to dismiss a
teacher. 69 The hearing officer, an independent, labor law professional
selected by the teacher and the board through the Illinois State Board of
Education, 70 conducts a public hearing at which a dismissed teacher may be
present, offer evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. 71 After hearing the
witnesses and considering the evidence, the hearing officer decides whether
the teacher should be dismissed or reinstated. 72
Pursuant to the Administrative Review Act, a party may appeal a hearing
officer's decision to the circuit court of the county in which the school dis-
trict is located. 73 A reviewing court first may consider whether a board and
67. Hall v. Board of Educ. (Chicago), 48 111. App. 3d 834, 841, 363 N.E.2d 116, 121 (1st
Dist. 1977). See Stasica v. Hannon, 70 Ill. App. 3d 785, 788, 388 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (1979);
Cohn v. Board of Educ. (Waukegan Dist. No. 119), 118 I11. App. 2d 453, 457, 254 N.E.2d 803,
805 (2d Dist. 1970).
"Abuse of discretion" has been defined as an "erroneous conclusion ... brought about by
temper, humor, caprice, passion, prejudice, perversity of will, discrimination, or partiality.-
People v. Johnson, 341 Ill. App. 423, 428, 94 N.E.2d 444, 447 (2(d Dist. 1950). In Johnson, the
court also stated that "'the exercise of honest judgment, based upon facts and conditions care-
fully considered and innately reasonable cannot be said to constitute an abuse of discretion." Id.
68. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977), ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 122, § 34-85 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979). Before the 1975 amendments to section 24-12 and the 1978 amendments to section
34-85, a school board condncted the hearing to determine whether a teacher should be dis-
missed. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1975); id. § 34-85 (1977).
69. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-85 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979).
70. ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 122, § 24-12 (1977); ILL, ANN. STAT. cl. 122, § 34-85 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979). These sections require that every hearing officer be accredited by a national labor
arbitration organization.
71. ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 122, § 24-12 (1977); ILL. ANN. SrAT. ch. 122, § 34-85 (Smith-Hurd
Stpp. 1979).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 122, § 34-85 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979). See Board of Educ. (Niles Township Dist. No. 219, Cook County) v. Epstein, 72
Ill. App. 3d 723, 725-26, 391 N.E.2d 114, 116 (1st Dist. 1979).
73. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-16 (1977).
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a hearing officer adhered to the due process requirements mandated by sec4
tion 24-12. '4 If actions or omissions substantially affect a teacher's rights, a
court must reverse a hearing officer's decision. 75 Because courts construe
section 24-12's procedural provisions strictly in favor of a board, 76 however,
teachers have particular difficulty in overturning administrative decisions by
a hearing officer based upon due process arguments.77
In addition, a reviewing court is empowered to review school board and
hearing officer decisions regarding the characterization of the conduct 78 to
determine if either has abused its discretion. 7 A court's power to do so,
however, is limited; it cannot reweigh the evidence,80 resolve conflicting
74. Fender v. School Dist. No. 25, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 739, 347 N.E.2d at 273. The pro-
cedural elements are important because section 24-12 is essentially procedural in nature. Neal
v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 189, St. Clair County), 56 IIl. App. 3d 10, 14, 371 N.E.2d 869,
872 (5th Dist. 1977).
75. Neal v. Board of Educ., 56 Ill. App. 3d at 13, 371 N.E.2d at 872. See Waller v. Board
of Educ., 13 111. App. 3d 1056, 1058, 302 N.E.2d 190, 192 (5th Dist. 1973).
76. Illinois Educ. Ass'n Local Community High School Dist. 218 v. Board of Educ., 62 111.
2d at 130, 340 N.E.2d at 9; Hauswald v. Board of Educ. (Dist. 217, Cook County), 20 III. App.
2d 49, 52, 155 N.E.2d 319, 321 (1st Dist. 1958).
77. See, e.g., Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 Ill. 2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398 (1979). In Gris-
sore, the board chairman was cited as publicly stating, "We never have stopped" trying to get
rid of the teacher. Id. at 321, 388 N.E.2d at 400. Although this was a clear expression of bias,
the court found nothing wrong with the board's procedures, stating that simply taking a public
position on a matter in dispute does not disqualify a board member, absent a showing that the
board member is not " 'capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances.' - Id. at 320, 388 N.E.2d at 400, quoting Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v.
Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976).
Illinois courts have addressed a series of clue process issues under sections 24-11 and 24-12.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-11, -12 (1977). These include: (1) form and service of the Notice
to Remedy, Notice of Dismissal, and Bill of Particulars, see, e.g., Morelli v. Board of Educ.
(Pekin Dist. No. 303), 42 Ill. App. 3d 722, 356 N.E.2d 438 (3d Dist. 1976); (2) the specificity of
the charges made by a board, see, e.g., Carrao v. Board of Educ. (Chicago), 46 111. App. 3d 33,
360 N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1977); (3) requirement of a hearing, see, e.g., Smith v. Board of
Educ. (East St. Louis Dist. No. 189), 52 III. App. 3d 647, 367 N.E.2d 296 (5th Dist. 1977); (4)
the role and bias of board members, see, e.g., Carrao v. Board of Educ., 46 Ill. App. 3d 33,
360, N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1977); (5) the role of the board's attorney, see, e.g., Fender v. School
Dist. No. 25, 37 I11. App. 3d 736, 347 N.E.2d 270 (1st Dist. 1976); (6) the effective date of
dismissal, see. e.g., Neal v. Board of Educ., 56 Ill. App. 3d 10, 371 N.E.2d 869 (5th Dist.
1977), (7) the findings of fact made by the board and the vote of the board to dismiss the
teacher, see. e.g., Reinhardt v. Board of Educ. (Alton Dist. No. 11), 61 111. 2d 101, 329 N.E.2d
218 (1975); (8) the open meetings law and board decisions, see, e.g., Davis v. Board of Educ.
(Farmer-City Mansfield Dist. No. 17), 63 111. App. 3d 495, 380 N.E.2d 58 (4th Dist. 1978); and
(9) the suspension of teachers pending hearing, see, e.g., Ynen v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No.
U-46, Kane et al. Counties), 77 I11. App. 2d 353, 222 N.E.2d 570 (2d Dist. 1966).
78. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 II1. 2d at 331, 388 N.E.2d at 405. See Gilliland v. Board
of Educ., 67 II1. 2d at 153, 365 N.E.2d at 326.
79. Hutchison v. Board of Educ., 32 111. App. 2d at 251-52, 177 N.E.2d at 423.
80. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 64, Cook County) v. Rittgers, No. 78-1447 (lst Dist. June 26,
1979) (order disposing of appeal); Carrao v. Board of Educ., 46 111. App. 3d at 40, 360 N.E.2d at
542.
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evidence, 81 nor substitute its judgment for a prior judgment. 82 Instead, a
court must accept the findings and conclusions of a hearing officer on ques-
tions of fact as prima facie true and correct. 83 A hearing officer's decision
will be affirmed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evi-
dence. 84
This system, allowing the use of a case-by-case method, protects the in-
terests of both teachers and local school boards. Teachers are fully protected
by the Teacher Tenure Act, which forces local school boards to consider
carefully whether the conduct is remediable or irremediable. 85 Teachers
also are protected by the assurance of an impartial administrative hearing
before a hearing officer and, if necessary, administrative review by the
courts. 86 At the same time, local school boards and the communities they
serve are left relatively free to control their own local school systems. By
broadly defining the scope of a board's power to dismiss and mandating only
certain due process requirements, the General Assembly has continued the
traditional delegation of a school's operation and management to the local
level, the level most familiar with the special needs and problems of its
community and students. 87
STANDARDS FOR DEFICIENT CONDUCT
Section 24-12's due process requirements operate in tandem with section
10-22.4, which grants a school board the power to dismiss a teacher for
specified reasons. 88 Specifically, a school board can dismiss a teacher for
"incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or other sufficient cause.' 89
The General Assembly has extended this power by permitting a school board
to dismiss a teacher when, in the board's opinion, the teacher is not qual-
ified to teach or when the interests of the school require a dismissal. 90 Ac-
cording to the statute, marriage and temporary mental or physical incapacity
to perform teaching duties are inappropriate causes of dismissal. 91
81. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 I11. 2d at 332-33, 388 N.E.2d at 406.
82. Id. at 331, 388 N.E.2d at 405.
83. Kupkowski v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs (Downers Grove), 71 Il. App. 3d 316,
323, 389 N.E.2d 219, 224 (2d Dist. 1979); Rolando v. School Directors, 44 Il. App. 3d at 661,
358 N.E.2d at 947. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Rittgers, No. 78-1447 (lst Dist. June 26, 1979) (order
disposing of appeal). The court stated that a trial court "is not bound by the agency's conclu-
sions of law." Id. at 3, citing Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Department of Revenue, 29 I11. 2d 564,
194 N.E.2d 257 (1963).
84. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 Ill. 2d at 331, 388 N.E.2d at 405. See Welch v. Board of
Educ., 45 I11. App. 3d at 38, 358 N.E.2d at 1367; Fender v. School Dist. No. 25, 37 I11. App.
3d at 742, 347 N.E.2d at 275.
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977).
86. Id. §§ 24-12, 24-16.
87. G. BEAUCHAMP, CURRICULUM THEORY 146-47 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
BEAUCHAMP].
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See note 7 supra.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Under case law, teacher misconduct falls within the following nine general
categories: (1) incompetency; (2) improper disciplinary techniques; (3) per-
sonal misconduct; (4) insubordination; (5) violation of school rules; (6) teacher
absences; (7) inadequate teaching qualifications; (8) dismissal in the best in-
terest of the school; and (9) miscellaneous. As previously discussed, school
boards, hearing officers, and courts must determine whether a teacher's al-
leged misconduct is remediable or irremediable when considering the dis-
missal of a teacher for one or more of these causes. 92 The remediability
issue pervades all the decisions-from a school board's initial decision to
send a warning notice for remediable causes to a court's final decision that a
school board's determinations were not contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence. Throughout, the general tests of irremediability are applied.
Additionally, hearing officers and courts have used private sector labor law
concepts to develop specific tests for differentiating between remediable and
irremediable conduct. Together, these tests comprise a surrounding-
circumstances test under which hearing officers and courts examine alleged
misconduct in light of a teacher's total job performance.
A. Incompetency
Illinois courts have not defined the term incompetency. 93 Instead, they
have accepted the schools boards' use of the term and have decided the
question of dismissal for incompetency according to the facts of each case.
The issue of incompetency encompasses the development and implementa-
tion of various teaching techniques, including the improper selection and use
of instructional methods and the lack of discipline or classroom control. 94
Both of these deficiencies can be either remediable or irremediable depend-
ing upon the particular facts of each case. 95 In general, a hearing officer or
92. See notes 49-66 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Comment, An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention, 48 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 80,
91-92 (1971). For a discussion of this problem nationally, see Rosenberger & Plimpton, Teacher
Incompetency and the Courts, 4 J. L. & EDUC. 469, 470-71 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rosen-
berger].
Other courts, however, and commentators have attempted to define incompetency. For
example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "[llncompetence is a relative term without
technical meaning. It may be employed as meaning disqualification, inability, incapacity, lack of
ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty." Board of Public Educ.
(Philadelphia) v. Beilan, 386 Pa. 82, 89, 125 A.2d 327, 330 (1956). See Rosenberger, supra at
470-71. One Illinois commentator defined incompetence as "the absence of a reasonably rele-
vant program of planned instruction." Comment, An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention, 48
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 80, 91-92 (1971).
94. See BEAUCHIAMP, supra note 87, at 142-43. Incompetency occurs while a teacher is
involved in instruction, the implementation of a curriculum. Id. at 196. Thus, the term instruc-
tion includes other teacher conduct that can be a cause for dismissal, including all of the other
categories listed in the text except insubordination, personal misconduct, and certain miscel-
laneous causes.
95. See, e.g., Grissom v. Board of Educ. (Buckley-Loda Dist. No. 8), 75 I11. 2d 314, 332-33,
388 N.E.2d 398, 405-06 (1979). The court reversed the teacher's dismissal, ruling that the
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court can examine the extent to which a teacher is able to correct allegedly
deficient conduct. Thus, a school board should specifically inform a teacher
of his or her weaknesses and then give a firm directive to correct the de-
ficiencies. The directive should not be a suggestion, 96 but should include a
concrete program with a demand to adopt it.97
charges of incompetency were remediable. Id. The teacher was charged with the "inability or
failure to discipline students, or maintain classroom discipline, . . . to convey proper classroom
instruction . . . [and] to utilize proper or appropriate instruction or teaching techniques." Id. at
322, 388 N.E.2d at 401. Even though the court found that there was evidence to support these
charges, the court ruled that the damage to the school was not severe, the board failed to show
uncorrectability, and the conduct appeared only within one school year. Id. at 332-33, 388
N.E.2d at 405-06. Justice Underwood dissented, noting that the principal wrote six letters to
the teacher during the year and that no noticeable improvements were made. Id. at 334, 388
N.E.2d at 406 (Underwood, J., dissenting). He stated that "[i]t will be quite difficult for school
boards to discharge their responsibilities to provide effective educational environments if their
findings are to be treated as cavalierly as my colleagues have treated these." Id. See Aulwurm
v. Board of Educ. (Murphysboro Dist. No. 186), 67 Ill. 2d 434, 437-43, 367 N.E.2d 1337,
1338-41 (1977) (charges of incompetency were found to be remediable; court pointed to specific
mitigating factors for each alleged instance of misconduct); Gilliland v. Board of Educ. (Pleasant
View Dist. No. 622), 67 IlI. 2d 143, 154, 365 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1977) (charges of ruining stu-
dent's attitudes toward school, lacking rapport with students, and giving irregular work assign-
ments to be irremediable because the evidence showed that the conduct extended over a period
of four years).
At the hearing officer level, decisions have also gone both ways. A dismissal was reversed in
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Isaac (Aug. 17, 1979) (Petersen, H.O.). The hearing officer noted that
although "there is ample room for improvement .... the Board has not shown in any tangible
way, that [the teacher's] students have suffered as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Id. at 5.
The hearing officer further stated that "[w]hile the testimony indicates [the teacher] had his
share of problems with classroom control, the contradictory nature of the testimony leaves one
to conclude that his classroom control was perhaps not too dissimilar to other teachers, or in
other words, was average." Id. The officer further stated that "teaching appears to be especially
difficult . . . because the calibre of students is not very high." Id. at 6. A dismissal was also
reversed in Board of Educ. (Niles Dist. No. 219) v. Agnos (Aug. 6, 1977) (Epstein, H.O.), affd
sub nom. Board of Educ. (Niles Dist. No. 219) v. Epstein, 72 II. App. 3d 723, 391 N.E.2d 114
(1st Dist. 1979), where the hearing officer found "that a good deal of the adverse criticism by
the grievant's students appears to be motivated by a feeling that they would like easier tests,
higher grades and a less demanding teacher." Id. at 55. The hearing officer noted that "students
who wish to be transferred may often use the vehicle of criticism to accomplish that end." Id. at
56. In the following cases, however, the hearing officers affirmed dismissals: School Bd. 138 v.
Rathjen (July 29, 1979) (Gerstein, H.O.) (failure to maintain classroom control); Carter v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ. (April 17, 1979) (Wilson, H.O.), appeal docketed, No. 79-L-10752 (Cook
County Cir. Ct. May 18, 1979) (incompetency shown by the fact that 23 students dropped out
of class); Evanston School Dist. No. 65 v. Hairston (Sept. 28, 1978) (Narko, H.O.) (lack of
preparation found irremediable).
96. See Hauswald v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 217, Cook County), 20 111. App. 2d 49, 54,
155 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1st Dist. 1958). The court in flauiswald found that although the assistant
principal urged the teacher to place more emphasis on English composition and grammar, the
directive" was left flexible and arguable. Id.
97. Wells v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 64, Cook County), 85 III. App. 2d 312, 322, 230
N.E.2d 6, 11 (1st Dist. 1967). Cf. McLain v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 52, Carmi), 36 I11. App.
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In addition to applying the general tests of irremediability, Illinois hear-
ing officers and courts wisely investigate three specific areas relating to in-
competency: (1) the teacher-student relationship; (2) the teaching methods
utilized; and (3) whether a teacher has been reassigned to a class for which
he or she is not trained. The particular factual framework of each case will
determine which of these areas is deserving of primary inquiry. For exam-
ple, in reversing the dismissal of a teacher charged with incompetency, one
hearing officer delineated and applied five factors demonstrating a teacher's
relationship with his or her students. 98 The factors considered included the
students' abilities to master the course content and the teacher's ability to
stimulate students to work, help students in their growth and development
as individuals, deal consistently and fairly with students, and create a warm
and friendly atmosphere in the classroom. 99
Another bearing officer examined the teacher's instructional methods to
determine the issue of incompetency. Correctly noting that "there are dif-
ferent approaches to the methodology" of teaching and that "what may work
for one teacher does not necessarily work for another," he asserted that the
mere use of a unique teaching method does not constitute incompe-
tence. 100 Extending this rationale, hearing officers and courts must realize
that not only each teacher, but also each type of subject matter and student
group may require different instructional methods.' 0 1 To dismiss a teacher
without examining why he or she used a particular teaching method and
without determining its effect upon the students clearly would violate all
notions of procedural due process.
Several cases have involved situations in which a teacher who was trained
in one subject area was reassigned to teach another subject due to financial
exigencies. Several hearing officers have observed that although a teacher
has trouble with a new subject, he or she may deserve to be retained in the
new teaching position because the teacher is maintaining classroom control
2d 143, 145-46, 183 N.E.2d 7, 8 (4th Dist. 1962). In McLain, the court affirmed the dismissal of
a teacher who held back pupils to the pace of the slowest pupil, was rigid in her treatment of
her pupils, and lacked cooperation, having been notified repeatedly both orally and in writing of
the defects. Id.
98. Board of Educ. (Crete-Monee Dist. No. 201-U) v. Angelotti, at 2, 45-47 (Nov. 9, 1976)
(Elson, H.O.). The hearing officer, acknowledging that a dismissal due to incompetency would
put an end to a professional career, required the school board to meet a substantial burden of
proof. Id. at 40.
99. Id. at 45-47.
100. Granite City Community Unit School Dist. No. 9 v. Lakin, at 6 (Aug. 25, 1976) (Adel-
man, H.0.).
101. SAYLOR & ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 250, 274. For example, the mere use of a
lecture format should not be a cause for dismissal. Instead, the board must consider when and
how the lecture method is being used in the total context of the teacher's instructional strategy.
Thus, a more valid measurement is whether the teacher varies the teaching techniques accord-
ing to the type of subject matter he or she is teaching. Similarly, teachers of handicapped
students cannot be held to the same standard as teachers of students not in special programs.
Because these students have special problems, the teaching techniques will differ.
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and is making efforts to improve instructional abilities. 102 One hearing of-
ficer, however, disagreed and affirmed the dismissal of a counselor assigned
to teaching duties. 103 Although the hearing officer acknowledged that the
board made an error by requiring the counselor to teach a substantive
course for which he was unqualified, the hearing officer asserted that efforts
were made to assist the teacher but that he failed to remedy the alleged
deficiencies. 104 Evidently, this hearing officer believed that a school board
should bear the burden of its reassignments, especially when dealing with a
tenured teacher. To first reassign a teacher to a course for which he or she
was not trained and then to dismiss that teacher due to instructional prob-
lems is patently inequitable. A school board must anticipate that a teacher
will need time to learn the course content, to develop appropriate teaching
methods, and to prepare adequately to teach. In such a situation, a board's
first duty and responsibility should be to help a teacher quickly develop the
knowledge and skills necessary to perform the new duties adequately. If,
after a reasonable time, a teacher is unable to improve his or her perfor-
mance, dismissal may be proper.
B. Improper Disciplinary Techniques
Dismissal for improper disciplinary techniques is usually a result of a
teacher's attempt to retain classroom control. 105 Section 10-22.4 of the
School Code specifically states that "cruelty" is a cause for dismissal. 10 6
102. See, e.g., Chapas v. Board of Educ. Dist. 203 (Oct. 14,-1978) (Dunham, H.O.) (foreign
language teacher assigned to teach math); Freeburg Community School v. Graham (Aug. 3,
1976) (Forman, H.O.) (biology and general science teacher assigned to teach chemistry). In
Graham, the hearing officer found that there was evidence that the teacher maintained his
appearance and pose, was punctual, and was enthusiastic about teaching. Id. at 7.
103. Danville Community Consol. School Dist. No. 118 v. Moutray (Aug. 26, 1976) (Adel-
man, H.O.).
104. Id. at 4-5.
105. Cruelty arises most frequently when associated with a teacher's use of punishment to
affect a student's behavior. Punishment may be defined as "withholding the satisfaction of a
need and inflicting pain or abuse" to influence conduct. R. MAGOON & K. GARRISON, EDUCA-
TIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTEGRATED VIEw 219 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
MAGOON]. The use of punishment may be necessary in some situations. Punishment is advan-
tageous when it is used as a deterrent and is particularly useful when it is a natural consequence
of an undesirable behavior, used along with rewards, and when a student realizes that the act
and not the child is being punished. C.E. SKINNER, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 459 (4th ed.
1959) [hereinafter cited as SKINNER]. When using punishment as a method of discipline, a
teacher should consider the form of the punishment, its severity, the time interval between the
misbehavior and the punishment, and whether the reason for the punishment is clearly under-
stood by the student. MAGOON, supra at 219. The more modern trend in discipline is to use
rewards to influence a student's behavior. Id. at 331. Rewards generate enthusiasm, interest,
and high morale and they are believed to have a positive effect on a student's ego development.
SKINNER, supra at 458. Although punishment also seeks to affect future conduct, it associates an
unpleasant feeling with the conduct. As Skinner asserts, were it not for the deterrence effect of
punishment, it "would have no reason for existing, except as an instrument of revenge and
sadism. It would be sheer cruelty." Id.
106. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See note 7 supra.
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Applying this mandate, Illinois courts have upheld the dismissals of teachers
whose use of punishments have ranged from harassing and grabbing stu-
dents 10 7 to using a cattle prod to maintain order. 108 As one court asserted,
a teacher should be dismissed if he or she fails "to portray the requisite
qualities of temper, discretion, and fortitude of a good teacher." 10 9
Until recently, courts considered the improper use of punishments to be
per se irremediable because of a teacher's inability to correct damage suf-
fered by a student. 110 In Grissom v. Board of Education, "I however, the
Illinois Supreme Court considered the severity of the damage suffered by
the student. Finding that the discipline was not severe, the court reversed
107. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 I11. 2d 143, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977). See Welch v. Board
of Educ. (Bement Dist. No. 5), 45 Ill. App. 3d 35, 358 N.E.2d 1364 (4th Dist. 1977) (a second
paddling given in violation of the board's disciplinary policy which required a cooling-off period
and cause for a paddling); Fender v. School Dist. No. 25 (Arlington Heights), 37 Ill. App. 3d
736, 347 N.E.2d 270 (1st Dist. 1976) (striking students); Hagerstrom v. Clay City Community
Unit School Dist. No. 10, 36 Il. App. 3d 1, 343 N.E.2d 249 (5th Dist. 1976) (improper corporal
punishment); McLain v. Board of Educ., 36 Il. App. 2d 143, 183 N.E.2d 7 (4th Dist 1962)
(extreme rigidity in discipline); Muehle v. School Dist. No. 38 (Lake County), 344 I. App. 365,
100 N.E.2d 805 (2d Dist. 1951) (making disparaging comments about parents and refusing to
allow students to use the washroom facilities resulting in soiled clothing).
108. See Rolando v. School Directors (Dist. No. 125, LaSalle County), 44 Ill. App. 3d 658,
358 N.E.2d 945 (3d Dist. 1976). The Rolando court stated: "[w]e harbor the gravest of doubts as
to the wisdom of the methods used by the plaintiff in his effort to cope with his problem." Id.
at 661, 358 N.E.2d at 947.
109. Robinson v. School Directors (Dist. No. 4, Madison County), 96 I11. App. 604, 606 (3d
Dist. 1901). Continuing, the court stated that the teacher, "by his own fault, deprived the
school of the benefit of all the good qualities he commanded." Id.
110. See, e.g., Rolando v. School Directors, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 662, 358 N.E.2d at 948. The
court ruled that the conduct was irremediable because
the damage had been done to the students, the faculty and to the school itself and
none of the damage could have been corrected even if written warnings had been
served upon the plaintiff [who] was well embarked upon his program of disciplinary
action before it came to the knowledge of his superiors or the community at large.
Id.
In late 1979, the First District Appellate Court stated that "[c]orporal punishment has been
held to be an irremediable cause for dismissal." Lowe v. Board of Educ. (Chicago), 76 Ill. App.
3d 348, 355, 395 N.E.2d 59, 63-64 (1st Dist. 1979). The court cited several cases for support,
including Rolando v. School Directors, 44 I11. App. 3d 658, 358 N.E.2d 945 (3d Dist. 1976), and
Fender v. School Dist. No. 25, 37 I11. App. 3d 736, 347 N.E.2d 270 (1st Dist. 1976). The court,
however, did not apply the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75
Ill. 2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398 (1979). In Grissom, the court expressly ruled that "the specific
instances attributed to plaintiff, [i.e., the excessive use of punishments] are all of a remediable
nature." Id. at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 405. In Lowe, Justice McGloon dissented, correctly noting
that corporal punishment can be considered remediable. He, too, however, also ignored Gris-
son. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 357-58, 395 N.E.2d at 65-66 (McGloon, J., dissenting).
111. 75 Ill. 2d at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 405. In Grissom, students testified that the teacher
"struck or 'tapped' students with a yardstick ... chased, caught and held, in a 'choking hold,' a
student .. . and slapped [another student]." Id. at 327, 388 N.E.2d at 403. The court called
these charges serious. Id. at 332, 388 N.E.2d at 405.
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the dismissal, even though Grissom's conduct approximated conduct found
irremediable in other cases involving harassment 1 12 and slapping. 113
In addition to the severity of damage caused by a teacher's conduct, 114
hearing officers and courts should also consider mitigating circumstances.
One appellate district analyzed the charges of cruelty in light of the nature
of the teacher's actions and, in addition, observed that the complaining stu-
dents did not testify at the hearing. 115 Another district, noting the need to
require students to behave orderly and respectfully, excused the use of phys-
ical force. 116
C. Personal Misconduct
Personal misconduct includes immorality, as stated in section 10-22.4, 117
as well as any conduct considered undesirable by a school board. 118 Be-
cause school boards hold teachers to a high standard of personal conduct, 119
112. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 I11. 2d 143, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977). See note 107 and
accompanying text supra.
113. Fender v. School Dist. No. 25, 37 Ill. App. 3d 736, 347 N.E.2d 270 (1st Dist. 1976).
See note 102 supra.
114. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Isaac (Aug. 13, 1979) (Petersen, H.O.). The hearing
officer stated that "it appears that at the very worst, [the teacher] could be cited for shaking
children. Although this type of behavior may not be desirable, given the circumstances, it
cannot be said that the evidence is definitive that he beat or struck his children." Id. at 8. In
Kankakee School Dist. No. 111 v. Richard (Feb. 2, 1978) (Berman, H.O.), the hearing officer
stated that he did "not believe that the school administration and the Board can countenance a
teacher's physical assault of, or the laying of hands upon, his students, except in the manner
provided for in the Rules and Regulations governing corporal punishment, absent the need for
self-defense." Id. at 10-11. Although the hearing officer found the teacher's conduct wrong, id.
at 14, he ruled that a board must "establish that the 'damage' . . . would have occurred had [the
teacher] been warned about his deficiencies," id. at 11. See Owens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ.
(Aug. 1, 1979) (Sembower, H.O.); Tremont Community Unit School Dist. 702 v. Shannon (Oct.
6, 1977) (Urban, H.O.).
115. Board of Educ. v. Epstein, 72 I11. App. 3d at 728, 391 N.E.2d at 118. Although the
teacher admitted calling students "knuckleheads" and "ring-a-lings," he said these "jokingly and
to students with whom he had good rapport." Id.
116. Miller v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 132, Cook County), 51 111. App. 2d 20, 31-33, 200
N.E.2d 838, 843-45 (1st Dist. 1964). The court noted the testimony that other teachers had hit
students, that force was used before the board approved its rules on discipline, and that prob-
lem students were involved. Id. The court also took "judicial notice of the present atmosphere
existing in the schools of this country." Id. at 33, 200 N.E.2d at 844.
117. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See generally Fleming, Teacher Dismissal for
Cause: Public & Private Morality, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 423 (1978); Comment, The Dismissal of
Public Schoolteachers for Aberrant Behavior, 64 Ky. L.J. 911 (1976).
118. School Directors v. Ewington, 26 Ill. App. 379, 380 (3d Dist. 1887).
119. Throughout Illinois' history, courts have held teachers to a high standard of moral con-
duct. For example, an early court stated that teachers "should be persons who for their known
virtue and morality are fitted to be trusted with the dearest treasures of the father and
mother-the person and mind of their child." Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 Ill. App. 347, 350 (4th
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hearing officers and courts should protect teachers from unwarranted inva-
sions into their private lives. Dismissal should result only from conduct that
meets the tests of irremediability and not from conduct that is private. 120
In addition, charges of personal misconduct should require strong evi-
dence and a close examination of the surrounding circumstances. For exam-
ple, proof of an uncontrollable temper 12 , or sexual relationships with stu-
dents 122 has led hearing officers and courts to affirm dismissals. According to
Illinois courts, this result is proper even if no criminal conviction has re-
sulted from a teacher's conduct. 123 Hearing officers and courts, noting
evidentiary deficiencies, have reversed dismissals of teachers who have
been charged with basing grades on a student's sale of tickets, 1 24 converting
Dist. 1885). A more recent court noted the teacher's leadership potential in the community and
stated that "the Board might properly fear the effect of social conduct in public" upon the
students. Scott v. Board of Educ. (Alton Dist. No. 11), 20 II1. App. 2d 292, 296, 156 N.E.2d 1,
3 (4th Dist. 1959).
120. This concept has been adopted by federal appellate courts. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy,
417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Norton, the court reversed the termination of a civil service
employee who was charged with an alleged homosexual advance toward another person. Id. at
1168. The court noted that the due process clause "forbids all dismissal which are arbitrary and
capricious. . . . [It] may also cut deeper ...where a dismissal involves an intrusion upon that
ill-defined area of privacy which is increasingly if indistinctly recognized as a foundation of
several specific constitutional protections. Id. at 1163-64. Accord, Mindel v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (court granted summary judgment in favor of
a postal clerk whose termination, due to his private sex life, violated the right to privacy guaran-
teed by the ninth amendment).
121. See, e.g., Kallas v. Board of Educ. (Marshall Dist. No. C-2), 15 Ill. App. 3d 450, 304
N.E.2d 527 (4th Dist. 1973) (affirmed dismissal of teacher whose temperamental outbursts in
class, with parents, and with the administration manifested a self-control insufficient to maintain
a proper rapport with the students); Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 111. App. 2d 20, 200 N.E.2d
838 (1st Dist. 1964) (affirmed the circuit court's reversal of the dismissal, finding that although
the teacher's judgment was poor, his temper was not uncontrollable).
122. See, e.g., Carrao v. Board of Educ. (Chicago), 46 Ill. App. 3d 33, 360 N.E.2d 536 (1st
Dist. 1977) (charge of taking indecent liberties with a minor supported by evidence); Yang v.
Special Charter School Dist. No. 150 (Peoria County), 11 111. App. 3d 239, 296 N.E.2d 74 (3d
Dist. 1973) (dismissal upheld because the teacher admitted playing strip poker with a student,
even though the teacher was acquitted of criminal charges); Lombardo v. Board of Educ. (Dist.
No. 27, Cook County), 100 Ill. App. 2d 108, 241 N.E.2d 495 (1st Dist. 1968) (evidence sup-
ported charge of touching and kissing female students); Chandler v. East St. Louis School Dist.
No. 189, 35 I11. App. 2d 317, 218 N.E.2d 774 (4th Dist. 1962) (evidence insufficient to prove
that teacher attempted to seduce female students).
123. See, e.g., Yang v. Special Charter School Dist. No. 150, 11 Ill. App. 3d 239, 296
N.E.2d 74 (3d Dist. 1973) (acquitted of criminal charge resulting from allegedly playing strip
poker with a student); Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 64, Cook County) v. Rittgers, No. 78-1447
(1st Dist. June 26, 1979) (order disposing of appeal) (acquitted of charge of intentionally and
fraudulently filing false claims with an insurance company).
124. Chandler v. East St. Louis School Dist. No. 189, 35 I11. App. 2d at 318, 182 N.E.2d at
775.
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school funds for personal use, 125 teaching with an alcoholic odor on the
breath, 126 and swearing at students. 127
More important than a sufficient amount of evidence is a hearing officer's
or court's consideration of the surrounding circumstances that may mitigate a
charge. In one case, a dismissal based upon a charge of drinking beer in a
public restaurant was reversed in light of the norms of modern society.' 2 8
Other examlles have included consideration of the types of students, 129 ill-
ness of a teacher, 130 a teacher's lack of intent to perform a criminal act, 131
and general community standards. 132
D. Insubordination
The charge of insubordination has been defined as the "wilful disobedi-
ence of a reasonable order emanating from a proper authority." 133  Although
125. Erway v. Board of Educ. (West Richland Community Unit No. 2) (Dec. 14, 1976) (Sem-
bower, H.O.). In this case, a principal was dismissed for violating his fiduciary duty when he
bought tires for his automobile out of school funds. The hearing officer reversed the dismissal
due to a mix-up in billing procedures at the school and 'the lack of evidence indicating a conspir-
acy to avoid payment of state taxes pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 22-6 (1977). Id. at
26. The hearing officer concluded that "unfortunate and inadvertent events" led to the princi-
pal's mistake. 1d. at 29.
126. Board of Educ. (School Dist. No. 118) v. Norris (Feb. 23, 1977) (Davidson, H.O.), aff'd,
No. 77 MR 54 (Vermillion County Cir. Ct. March 15, 1977). The hearing officer found no
evidence "that [the teacher] had consumed alcohol either on the school premises or during
school hours" or "that ...her efficiency ...was diminished in any manner or that her associa-
tion and cooperation with other teachers was impaired." Id. at 3.
127. Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 111. App. 2d at 34, 200 N.E.2d at 845 (insufficient evidence
to support charge that the teacher called a student a "damn little rebel"); Chandler v. East St.
Louis School Dist. No. 189, 35 Ill. App. 2d at 324, 182 N.E.2d at 778 (charge of using lewd
language and telling off-color jokes not proven).
128. Board of Educ. (Kaneland Dist. No. 302) v. Holmes (July 26, 1976) (Azulay, H.O.). The
hearing officer asserted that "the consumption of a glass of beer is not considered to be unsoci-
able, illegal, or unacceptable behavior in our society." id. at 4.
129. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 Ill. App. 2d at 36, 200 N.E.2d at 846.
130. See, e.g., Gould v. Board of Educ. (Ashley Dist. No. 15), 32 Ill. App. 3d 808, 336
N.E.2d 69 (5th Dist. 1975).
131. Board of Educ. (School Dist. No. 150) v. Dorethy (Aug. 23, 1976) (Adelman, H.O.).
Here, the teacher attempted to purchase stolen CB radios from his students. Because he did
not know that the radios were stolen, however, the hearing officer concluded that he did not act
in an "immoral, incompetent, or irresponsible manner." Id. at 3.
132. See Stone v. Board of Educ. (North Green Dist. No. 3) (March 16, 1977) (Martin,
H.O.). The teacher made the following disparaging remark about religion: "Well, aren't all
Christians hypocrites?" Id. at 5. The teacher also manifested a liberal, independent attitude in
his supervision of the editors of the student yearbook, including allowing alcohol to be served to
the editors, allowing degrading editorials to be printed in the yearbook, and not communicating
with the principal on the yearbook's budget. Id. at 14. The hearing officer asserted that the
teacher was "an unruly man" who "did not meet the standards required of a teacher" in that
district and that "the combination of this teacher and this district was a mnutual misfortune." Id.
at 14-16.
133. Legislative Development, Teacher Dismissal Legislation: The Nevada Approach, 6
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 112, 116 (1968). See generally Punke, Insubordination in Teacher Dism is-
sal, 45 Micu. ST. B.J. 51 (1966).
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this is a delicate, nebulous area because of the nature of personal relation-
ships within a school, 134 cooperation among teachers, administrators, stu-
dents, and parents is essential for the proper maintenance of a viable school
system. 135 Consequently, in addition to relying on the tests of irremediabil-
ity, 136 hearing officers and courts should examine the nature of any direc-
tions given to a teacher and the type and extent of a teacher's alleged insub-
ordinate conduct. This process will alleviate possible unfairness and the ef-
fect of personal antipathy that can develop between a teacher and his or her
superiors.
Even before examining a teacher's alleged insubordinate conduct, hearing
officers and courts should first examine the nature of a direction given to a
teacher by his or her superior. Alleged violations of an order should be
brought to a teacher's attention. 137 In addition, the order must be reasona-
ble; the mere assertion of a directive and a teacher's disobedience of it does
not constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal. 138 Although hearing officers
and courts should not foster insubordination by encouraging a teacher to
decide which orders to follow, an order must be valid, appropriate, and not
in violation of state law. 139 Following such reasoning, one hearing officer
134. Kallas v. Board of Educ., 15 I. App. 3d at 453, 304 N.E.2d at 529.
135. Id. See Legislative Development, Teacher Dismissal Legislation: The Nevada Approach,
6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 112, 116 (1968).
136. See, e.g., Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 111. 2d at 332-33, 388 N.E.2d at 405-06. In
Grissom, the court ruled that the teacher's failure to accept orders or to act upon suggestions
was remediable because the conduct was correctible and did not last over a long period of time.
Id. Accord, Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 Ill. App. 2d at 321, 230 N.E.2d at 10 (court referred to
"very few specific instances exemplifying this alleged attitude"). Cf. Robinson v. Community
Unit School Dist. No. 7, 35 Ill. App. 2d at 330, 182 N.E.2d at 773 (court upheld the dismissal
noting that the trouble existed over a period of years and instilled a feeling of futility in the
minds of the faculty and administration).
137. Allione v. Board of Educ. (South Fork Dist. No. 310), 29 I11. App. 2d 261, 265, 173
N.E.2d 13, 15 (3d Dist. 1961).
138. Berwyn Community School Dist. No. 100 (Cook County) v. Metskas, at 9 (Feb. 16,
1979) (Davidson: H.O.), appeal docketed, No. 79 L 5960 (Cook County Cir. Ct. March 22,
1979). In this case, the school board asserted that the teacher's contract included participation
in the state's music contest. Brief and Argument for Defendant at 3. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI,
supra note 43, at 641. The Elkouris state that "one of the two most commonly recognized
principles .. . is that there must be reasonable rules or standards, consistently applied and
enforced and widely disseminated," and that "[a]ll employees who engage in the same type of
misconduct must be treated essentially the same unless a reasonable basis exists for variations in
the assessment of punishment." Id. at 643-44.
139. See Berwyn Community School Dist. No. 100 v. Metskas, at 10 (Feb. 16, 1979) (David-
son, H.O.). The hearing officer in Metskas stated:
In the event a School Board requires a tenured teacher to be employed at a
salary less than that set forth in Section 24-8 and the tenured teacher refuses to so
comply, is that the type of insubordination that would authorize dismissal of the
teacher?
There are numerous other instances in which the refusal to comply with a direc-
tion of the Board could be treated' as insubordination so as to justify dismissal of a
tenured teacher, i.e., the fostering of bias or prejudice based on color, race, sex,
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correctly reversed the dismissal of a teacher who was forced to teach on
Saturday in violation of the School Code. 140
After examining the directive, a hearing officer or court should analyze a
teacher's conduct. When, for example, a teacher resents authority and is
"unnecessarily argumentative, stubborn [and] inattentive to suggestions,"' 14 1
hearing officers and courts should affirm the dismissal. Examples of such
conduct justifying dismissal have included refusing to change even trivial
matters14 2 or to follow mandatory directives, 143 making accusations about
other teachers 144 or a principal, 145 and threatening and then striking a prin-
cipal. 146 Where, however, a teacher does not intend to act in an insubordi-
nate manner, 147 or honestly disagrees with his or her superiors, but con-
tinues to perform satisfactorily, 14 courts may reverse a teacher's dismissal.
religion or nationality, the segregation of students based on any of the foregoing, the
requirement that teachers employ physical punishment on students, and even,
perhaps, the scheduling of classes for a teacher to run twenty-four hours at a time.
It clearly would defy all logic that because a School Board requires action to be
taken by a tenured teacher, no matter what that form of action is, and the tenured
teacher refused to so take the form of action directed, then that would be insubor-
dination of the type that would justify dismissal of the teacher and one that would
have to be sustained either by a hearing officer or by a competent Court reviewing
the hearing officer's decision.
Id.
140. Id. at 9-10. In brief, the teacher, the conductor of the school's orchestra, was dismissed
after he refused to participate in the state contests for solos, ensembles, and orchestras. The
teacher refused because the board reduced the pay for these extra duties, which were to take
place on Saturday. Id. Section 24-2 of the Illinois School Code, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979), states that a "teacher shall not be required to teach on Saturdays."
Therefore, requiring the teacher to teach on Saturdays, while attending and helping his stu-
dents in the contest, was a violation of the School Code. See Littrell v. Board of Educ. (Cave-
In-Rock Dist. No. 2), 45 I11. App. 3d 690, 697, 360 N.E.2d 102, 106 (5th Dist. 1977); District
200 Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. (Dundee Dist. No. 300), 31 111. App. 3d 550, 334 N.E.2d
165 (2d Dist. 1975).
141. Homewood-Flossmoor School Dist. No. 233 (Cook County) v. Divila, at 16, 24 (Jan. 17,
1978) (Dolnick, H.O.).
142. See, e.g., McLain v. Board of Educ., 36 Il. App. 2d at 147, 183 N.E.2d at 9.
143. See, e.g., Homewood-Flossmoor School Dist. No. 233 v. Divila (Jan. 17, 1978) (Dolnick,
H.O.).
144. See, e.g., Morelli v. Board of Educ. (Pekin Dist. No. 303), 42 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725, 356
N.E.2d 438, 441 (3d Dist. 1976) (teacher accused other teachers of condoning the use of drugs).
145. Jepsen v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 307, Kankakee County), 19 Il. App. 2d 204, 208,
153 N.E.2d 417, 419 (2d Dist. 1958) (accused principal of concealing the ineligibility of a foot-
ball player).
146. Owens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ. (July 30, 1979) (Sembower, H.O.).
147. Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 II. 2d 434, 367 N.E.2d 1337 (1977). The teacher, who
was charged with refusing to follow the direct order of the head football coach, id. at 440-41,
367 N.E.2d at 1340, did not know that the other teacher had been designated as the head
coach. Id.
148. Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 Il1. App. 2d at 321, 230 N.E.2d at 10. The court noted that
the teacher, "although convinced the views of her superiors were erroneous, attempted to com-
ply [and] . . . that she patiently and conscientiously worked with the unfortunate and difficult
children trying to develop their limited ability, helping them to overcome their handicaps." Id.
Accord, Hutchison v. Board of Educ. (Greenfield Dist. No. 10), 32 Ill. App. 2d 247, 254, 177
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E. Violation of School Rules
School boards have the power to make and enforce rules for the manage-
ment and governance of a school system. 149 Although, as with insubordina-
tion, hearing officers and courts should not encourage a teacher to exercise
absolute freedom of choice, a single violation of school rules should not
necessarily lead to dismissal. 150 Instead, hearing officers and courts should
analyze the type of rule broken and decide whether a teacher's conduct
meets the tests of irremediability by considering relevant surrounding cir-
cumstances.
If a school's administration or board wants to ensure a valid dismissal for
the violation of a rule, the rule can be adopted by the board, in written
form, and clearly stated. 151 Dismissal may then be appropriate where a
school board demonstrates that a teacher had knowledge of the policy and
the intent to disregard it. For example, one appellate district affirmed the
dismissal of a teacher who twice paddled a student in violation of a known
school rule requiring a cooling-off period. 152 If, however, a policy is not
mandatory, 153 is ignored by other teachers and administrators, 154 or is of
little consequence to a school system, 155 dismissal may not be appropriate.
Thus, another appellate court ruled that because the failure to perform
ministerial tasks did not harm the quality of the teacher's instruction, the
dismissal should be reversed. 156
N.E.2d 420, 424 (3d Dist. 1961) (superintendent testified that the teacher "had been co-
operative and had never refused to carry out orders").
149. Littrell v. Board of Educ., 45 Ill. App. 3d at 697, 360 N.E.2d at 106-07.
150. The rule of law regarding violations of school rules is changing. Originally, a single
violation would justify dismissal. See, e.g., Leddy v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 99, Bureau
County), 160 I11. App. 187 (2d Dist. 1911). In Leddy, the court stated that "to hold otherwise
would be assuming the position that a teacher ... could assume control of the school affairs
• ..and thereby materially interfere with the proper and legal conduct of the school." Id. at
190. Recently, however, hearing officers have examined the rule itself before affirming a dismis-
sal. See notes 153, 155, 156 and accompanying text infra.
151. See, e.g., Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 I11. App. 2d at 318, 230 N.E.2d at 9. Regarding
lesson plans, one court noted that a school board can adopt a rule requiring teachers to prepare
behavioral objectives. Littrell v. Board of Educ., 45 I11. App. 3d at 697, 360 N.E.2d at 107.
152. Welch v. Board of Educ., 45 I11. App. 3d at 39, 358 N.E.2d at 1367. See note 107
supra.
153. Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 111. 2d at 439, 367 N.E.2d at 1339; School Dist. No. 147
v. Banks, at 18 (Jan. 4, 1978) (Gerstein, H.O.), aff'd sub non. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 147,
Cook County) v. State Bd. of Educ., No. 78 C 3061 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Feb. 10, 1978).
154. Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 I11. 2d at 439, 367 N.E.2d at 1339; Board of Educ. v.
Dorethy (Aug. 23, 1976) (Adelman, H.O.).
155. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Epstein, 72 Ill. App. 3d 723, 391 N.E.2d 114 (1st Dist.
1979).
156. Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 I11. App. 2d at 318, 230 N.E.2d at 9. See Werner v.
Community Unit School Dist. No. 4 (Marshall County), 40 Ill. App. 2d 491, 495, 190 N.E.2d
184, 188 (2d Dist. 1963); Hauswald v. Board of Educ., 20 111. App. 2d at 54-56, 155 N.E.2d at
322. In Hauswald, the court noted that the teacher's "'superiors had no firm policy which plain-
tiff was required to adopt, and ... the point was left flexible and arguable." Id. at 54, 155
N.E.2d at 322.
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F. Teacher Absences
Dismissal for unexcused absences, tardiness, and abandonment 15 7 are
closely related to dismissal resulting from insubordination and the violation
of school rules. A teacher should not be permitted to ignore his or her re-
sponsibilities by violating administrative policies regarding absences. Special
circumstances, however, can and should mitigate any damage caused by ab-
sence or tardiness.
Dismissal is appropriate, for example, where a teacher willfully violates a
board's direction not to attend a conference unrelated to teaching duties. 15
Similarly, hearing officers have upheld dismissals for excessive absen-
teeism, 159 a consistent pattern of tardiness, 160 and the failure to appear at
the beginning of a school year. 161 Hearing officers and courts, however,
should reverse a dismissal where an absence does not result in severe
consequences1 6 2 or where special circumstances excuse the conduct. In one
case, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a teacher who
missed the first half of a sports event due to a rainstorm that made atten-
dance impossible. 163 In another case, a hearing officer excused a teacher's
failure to participate in a state-wide music contest because participation vio-
lated the School Code. 1 4 Finally, a hearing officer excused a teacher's fail-
ure to appear at the beginning of the school year because the board had
157. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Galatia Dist. No. 1), 38 Ill. App. 3d 403, 409, 347 N.E.2d
791, 796 (5th Dist. 1976). The Brown court defined abandonment to require a clear manifesta-
tion of intent not to teach. Id. While the court ruled that a teacher can lose tenured status by
abandonment or resignation, in this case abandonment did not occur because the teacher wrote
two letters requesting to teach half time. Id.
158. Yuen v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. U-46, Kane, Cook, & DuPage Counties), 77 1l1. App.
2d 353, 356-58, 222 N.E.2d 570-72 (21 Dist. 1966); Spring Valley Elementary School Dist. No.
99 (Bureau County) v. Christopherson, at 6 (Jan. 6, 1979) (Davidson, H.O.), aff'd, No. 79-MR-5
(Bureau County Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-922 (3(d Dist. Jan. 11, 1980).
159. See, e.g., Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 25) v. Johnson (June 29, 1979) (DePree, H.O.);
Evanston School Dist. No. 65 v. Hairston (Sept. 28, 1978) (Narko, H.O.).
160. Wapella Community School Dist. No. 5 v. Hindman, at 7 (June 18, 1976) (Elkin, H.O.).
161. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Black (Jan. 15, 1979) (Petersen, H.O.); Worth Coin-
munity High School Dist. 218 v. Smith (Jan. 16, 1978) (Urban, H.O.); Homewood -Flossmoor
Community High School Dist. No. 233 v. Holdych (June 28, 1977) (Urban, H.O.). See Farmer
City-Mansfield Community Unit School Dist. No. 17 (DeWitt, Piatt, & McLean Counties) v.
Davis, at 10 (June 20, 1977) (Forman, H.O.), aff'd sub non. Davis v. State Bd. of Educ., No.
77-L-118 (DeWitt County Cir. Ct. Feb. 6, 1978) (teacher failed to appear because he was
operating a store he had purchased); Maine Township High School Dist. 207 v. Stolarz, at 2
(Sept. 30, 1977) (Urban, H.O.) (teacher's failure to appear damaged morale of the faculty and
the school itself).
162. See, e.g., Hanswald v. Board of Educ., 20 Ill. App. 2(1 at 55, 155 N.E.2d at 323 (court
found that the teacher was absent from class only five to ten times a week). Cf. School Direc-
tors v. Birch, 93 Ill. App. 499 (2d Dist. 1900) (court upheld the dismissal because the teacher's
tardiness injured students who had to wait outside in the cold).
163. Anlwnrmn v. Board of Educ., 67 Ill. 2(1 at 442, 367 N.E.2d at 1340-41.
164. Berwyn Community School Dist. No. 100 v. Metskas (Feb. 16, 1979) (Davidson, H.O.),
aff'd, No. 79 L 5960 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 1979).
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denied a necessary leave of absence in retaliation for the teacher's union
activities. 165
G. Inadequate Teaching Qualifications
Section 10-22.4 states that a school board may dismiss a teacher
whenever, in its opinion, a teacher is not qualified to teach. IN Often, a
board uses this vague, catch-all cause for dismissal after listing the charges of
incompetency and insubordination. 167 Hence, a board may add this cause
for dismissal to a notice to remedy or a notice of dismissal as an independent
cause or as a summary or conclusion of previously-listed charges.
Illinois courts' conflicting definitions demonstrate the vagueness of this
cause for dismissal. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that this cause
includes a teacher's lack of adequate and efficient standards of instruction, 168
equating qualification to teach with a charge of incompetency. Further, the
court has rebutted the contention that this cause for dismissal embraces a
teacher's proper state certification to teach. 169 Nevertheless, an appellate
district did uphold a teacher's dismissal for the failure to complete additional
credits of schooling as part of professional growth. 170 In this case, the court
observed the fact that the teacher had experienced no professional growth
for twenty-four years and that other teachers did comply with this require-
ment. 171
Illinois courts should more precisely articulate the meaning of "qualifica-
tion to teach." It may include incompetency as well as lack of continued
professional standing. If, however, it merely repeats other charges
adequately covered by other causes for dismissal, this cause for dismissal is
meaningless, adds nothing, and should play no role in the process of a
teacher's dismissal.
H. Dismissal in the Best Interest of the School
As with the preceding cause, dismissal if "the interests of the school re-
quire it"1 72 is also vague and based on a school board's subjective judgment.
It is often added to the list of causes stated in a warning notice and a notice
of dismissal and appears to be pro forma, 173 adding nothing to the dismissal
165. Board of Educ. (Niles Dist. No. 219) v. Drum (July 19, 1976) (Dolnick, H.O.).
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See note 7 supra.
167. See, e.g., Board of Educ. (Aurora No. 131) v. Murray, No. 77 MR 10546 (Kane County
Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-29 (2d Dist. Nov. 13, 1978).
168. Lenard v. Board of Educ. (Fairfield Dist. No. 112), 74 I11. 2d 260, 266, 384 N.E.2d
1321, 1325 (1979), quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 2-3.25 (1977).
169. Id. at 264, 384 N.E.2d at 1324. See Comment, An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention,
48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 80, 90 (1971).
170. Last v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 321, Winnebago & Stepheson Counties), 37 I11. App.
2d 159, 166, 185 N.E.2d 282, 285 (2d Dist. 1962).
171. Id. at 165, 185 N.E.2d at 285.
172. ILL. REv. STAT. cb. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See note 7 supra.
173. See, e.g., Allione v. Board of Educ., 29 111. App. 2d 261, 173 N.E.2d 13 (3d Dist. 1961);
Hauswald v. Board of Educ., 20 Ill. App. 2d 49, 155 N.E.2d 319 (1st Dist. 1958).
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process. One writer, however, has asserted that this vague standard is a "ray
of light" in teacher dismissals. 174 Several courts have agreed, one court
calling it the "principal concern" in a teacher dismissal hearing, 175 and
another court calling it a "guiding star.'' 176 Such statements imply that
courts will elevate a board's opinion as to the best interest of the school
above specific evidence of misconduct. This practice is clearly contrary to
the purpose of the Teacher Tenure Act, which prevents arbitrary, unreason-
able, or capricious decisions by school boards. 177
Evidence supporting this cause for dismissal has included the continuous
nature of and combination with other, more specific deficiencies with which
a teacher is charged. 178 For example, proof of a lack of cooperation with
the administration has sustained this cause for dismissal. 179 Student dis-
satisfaction with a particular type of course, however, fell "far short of estab-
lishing that [a teacher's] 'presence' was detrimental to the best interest of
the school."' 180  Further, a hearing officer ruled that evidence showing the
use of teaching methods different from those espoused by the school au-
thorities did not support a charge that a teacher's conduct was detrimental
to tile best interests of the school. 181
A hearing officer or court can most logically and usefully analyze this cause
for dismissal by examining the charge in light of section 24-12's requirement
of a specific charge. 182 Although one court stated that this cause for dismis-
sal is sufficiently specific because it incorporates causes specified in section
10-22.4, 183 another court held that this unamplified reason for dismissal was
insufficient because it merely repeated verbatim one of the causes in section
10-22.4. 184 Accordingly, one hearing officer contended that this charge is
174. See generally Kelleghan, stpra note 8.
175. Robinson v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 7, 35 Ill. App. 2d at 330, 182 N.E.2d at
773.
176. Meridith v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 7, Christian County), 7 I11. App. 2d 477, 486, 130
N.E.2d 5, 10 (3d Dist. 1955). In fil, the court stated that "the best interest of the schools of
the district is the guiding star of the Board of Education and for the courts to interfere with the
exercise of the power of the board . . . is [an] onwarranted assumption of authority and can only
be justified in cases where the board has acted maliciously, capriciotisly and arbitrarily." Id.
177. See Allione v. Board of Educ., 29 Ill. App. 2d at 268, 173 N.E.2d at 17. In Allione, the
court stated: "To sustain the Board's conclusion that the best interest of the school required
plaintiff's dismissal in the absence of proof supporting it, would amount to sanctioning the
practice of arbitrarily dismissing teachers without regard to their rights tinder the Tenure Law."
Accord, McLain v. Board of Educ., 36 I11. App. 2d at 147, 183 N.E.2d at 9.
178. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 Ill. 2d at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 327.
179. Morelli v. Board of Educ., 42 Ill. App. 3d at 730, 356 N.E.2d at 443; Kallas v. Board of
Educ., 15 Ill. App. 3d at 454, 304 N.E.2d at 530.
180. Hutchison v. Board of Educ., 32 Ill. App. 2d at 255, 177 N.E.2d at 425.
181. Board of Educ. v. Agnos (Aug. 6, 1977) (Epstein, H.O.), aff'd sub nora. Board of Educ.
v. Epstein, 72 Ill. App. 3d 723, 391 N.E.2d 114 (1st Dist. 1979).
182. ILL. REX'. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977).
183. Pearson v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 5, Macoupin County), 12 Ill. App. 2d 44, 48-49,
138 N.E.2d 326, 328 (3d Dist. 1956). See ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977); note 7
supra.
184. Wells v. Board of Educ., 85 Ill. App. 2d at 318-19, 230 N.E.2d at 9-10.
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nothing more than a "conclusion and a summary." 18 5  Because of its vague-
ness and repetitive use, Illinois' General Assembly and courts should abolish
it as a viable alternative cause for dismissal.
I. Miscellaneous
Courts have also considered instances of alleged misconduct that do not fit
neatly into any of the above categories. For example, the Illinois courts and
General Assembly have dealt with a charge of mental illness or incapacity on
the part of a teacher. In 1968, the First District Appellate Court found that
emotional instability was an irremediable cause for dismissal. 186 In 1972,
the same district court also affirmed the dismissal of a teacher who failed to
undergo a psychological examination by a board-approved psychologist.' 87
The court stated that a board did not have to wait "until [the teacher's]
behavior [became] so aberrational as to be . . . grounds for dismissal."188
In a 1975 amendment to section 10-22.4, however, the General Assembly
abrogated this rule of law, making "temporary mental or physical incapacity"
no longer a cause for dismissal.' 8 9
How this provision will be interpreted is unclear. The Illinois General
Assembly and the Illinois Judiciary need to define "temporary." For exam-
ple, it may mean that a teacher is able to correct the incapacity or that the
incapacity is of a type that does not cause severe damage to the student,
faculty, or school. In addition, courts should remember this prohibition
when examining other charges brought against a teacher. Thus, if a teacher
is dismissed due to lack of classroom control and this deficient conduct was
caused by a temporary mental incapacity, a hearing officer or court may
reverse the dismissal. Such a result may be especially appropriate in cases in
which a teacher is undergoing psychiatric or medical care that can improve
his or her classroom performance.
A second area of miscellaneous conduct that is not a legal cause for dismis-
sal is a teacher's exercise of his or her first amendment right to free speech.
In Pickering v. Board of Education,'9 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal of an Illinois teacher who wrote a letter to a local
185. Stone v. Board of Educ., at 7 (March 16, 1977) (Martin, H.O.).
186. See Lombardo v. Board of Educ., 100 I11. App. 2d at 114, 241 N.E.2d at 498 (teacher
cried and screamed when the principal told him about the charges).
187. Tetmeir v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 149, Cook County), 5 I11. App. 3d 982, 985, 284
N.E.2d 380, 382 (1st Dist. 1972).
188. Id. at 986, 284 N.E.2d at 382-83.
189. Act of Sept. 11, 1975, P.A. 79-954, 1975 I11. Laws 2871 (amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
122, § 24-12 (1975)).
190. 391 U.S. 563, 575 (1968) (Township High School Dist. 205, Will County). See Com-
ment, Illinois Supreme Court Review, 62 Nw. L. REv. 738 (1967); Note, Constitutional
Law-Freedom of Speech -Dismissal of Teacher Who Published Letter Critical of School Offi-
cials Within Power of School Board, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 194 (1967). See generally Com-
ment, First Amendment Rights & Teacher Dismissal: A Survey, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 392
(1977).
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newspaper criticizing the district's allocation of hunds. The Court ruled that
because the letter regarded matters of public concern and presented no
question of faculty discipline or harmony, the dismissal must be re-
versed. 191 Following similar reasoning, hearing officers have reversed dis-
missals of teachers who would not join a local union 192 and teachers who
engaged in a union-sponsored strike. 193
Finally, hearing officers and courts have addressed other areas of miscel-
laneous conduct. Due to the particular facts of each case, dismissals of
teachers charged with the failure to protect school property, 194 the failure to
produce a school play, 19 5 and the use of physical force in self-defense
have been reversed. 196  Dismissals have been affirmed in cases involving such
diverse conduct as failure adequately to pursue a course of study while on a
sabbatical' 97 and excessive devotion of time to non-school activities that in-
terfere with in-school responsibilities. 198
191. 391 U.S. at 569-70.
192. Board of Educ. (Dist. 204) v. LaVine (March 14, 1978) (Stack, H.O.). An agency shop
provision of the collective bargaining agreement provided that "if a teacher does not join the
Association, such teacher will, as a condition of continued employment by the Board: (1) Exe-
cute an authorization for the deduction of. . .dues ... to be paid by members of the Associa-
tion ...or (2) Pay directly to the Association ...dues." Id. at 5-6. The hearing officer ruled
this provision unconstitutional and the dismissal unlawful. Id. at 15.
193. Sandwich Community Unit School Dist. No. 430 v. Haick (May 22, 1978) (Nathan,
H.O.). Although 65 teachers struck, only Haick was dismissed because he refused to sign a
pledge that he would not strike during the rest of the year. Id. at 17. The hearing officer ruled
that such conduct was remediable because no one was injured by the strike since the strike did
not affect students' attendance in school. Id. at 16.
194. See Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 III. 2d at 322-23, 388 N.E.2d at 401 (teacher charged
with failure to protect desks from graffiti and textbooks from theft).
195. Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 II1. 2d at 439-40, 367 N.E.2d at 1339-40. The teacher
could not produce a Broadway musical because of the unavailability of musicians and because
the principal would not allow the teacher to produce four one-act plays, calling them unsuitable.
Id. at 440, 367 N.E.2d at 1340.
196. Service Employees Local 46 v. Chicago Bd. of Educ. (June 26, 1979) (Sembower,
H.O.).
197. Pittel v. Board of Educ. (Dist. 111, Cook County), 20 Ill. App. 3d 580, 585, 315 N.E.2d
179, 182-83 (1st Dist. 1974). The teacher attended only two of ten courses that the Board
approved. Id. at 585, 315 N.E.2d at 182-83. The court ruled that the board's action in dismiss-
ing the teacher was not arbitrary because she knew what was expected of her when the leave
was granted by the board. Id. at 585, 315 N.E.2d at 183. Looking at Section 24-6.1 of the
School Code, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-6.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979), the court ruled the
conduct irremediable because "[t]his section does not state that warnings are required" and
because "[t]he penalty for this type of conduct was set forth in unequivocal terms." Id. at 588,
315 N.E.2d at 185.
198. Farmer City-Mansfield Community Unit School Dist. No. 17 v. Davis (June 20, 1977)
(Forman, H.O.), aff'd sub non. Davis v. State Bd. of Educ., No. 77-L-118 (DeWitt County
Cir. Ct. Feb. 6,1978). See Meridith v. Board of Educ., 7 111. App. 2d at 486, 130 N.E.2d at 9.
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THE BEST (?) EVIDENCE
Whether or not a board's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence, 199 hearing officers' and courts' decisions focus on the evidence
gathered and introduced by a teacher and a school board. Practitioners for
both parties need first to understand the nature of irremediable conduct and
then to use the best evidence to support their arguments. Evidence should
be collected even before a dismissal process begins. Teachers must be aware
of the types of conduct that may lead to dismissal proceedings and what
evidence will be used to sustain or reverse a board's decision. Similarly, a
school board must establish policies and procedures for the objective collec-
tion of relevant information about a teacher's conduct. Only then can a
school board make a reasonable and supportable decision that is equitable to
both a teacher and a community.
To determine whether a teacher's dismissal is contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence, a hearing officer or reviewing court must determine
whether a dismissal finds support in the evidence. 200 As one court stated,
"[w]here the proof fails, the charge fails." 201 The evidence must be more
than scanty, 202 but need not be strong and convincing, as in criminal
cases. 20 3 Instead, competent and sufficient evidence 20 4 must prove that
cause for dismissal existed and that the cause was irremediable. 205 A deci-
sion will not be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence unless an
opposite conclusion is clearly evident. 206 A court will not, however, reverse
a hearing officer's or lower court's decision simply because an opposite
conclusion is reasonable. 207
Courts have also considered the nature of the evidence introduced at a
hearing. Two Illinois courts have ruled that hearsay evidence is insufficient
199. Grissom v. Board of Educ. (Buckley-Loda Dist. No. 8), 75 I11. 2d 314, 333, 388 N.E.2d
398, 405 (1979).
200. Morelli v. Board of Educ. (Pekin Dist. No. 303), 42 I11. App. 3d 722, 727, 356 N.E.2d
438, 442 (3d Dist. 1976); Kallas v. Board of Educ. (Marshall Dist. No. C-2), 15 Ill. App. 3d 450,
453, 304 N.E.2d 527, 529 (4th Dist. 1973).
201. Chandler v. East St. Louis School Dist. No. 189 (St. Clair County), 35 I11. App. 2d 317,
324, 182 N.E.2d 774, 778 (4th Dist. 1962).
202. Id. The court described the evidence as general and vague, and as constituting -conclu-
sions without the benefit of specific instances." id.
203. Lombardo v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 27, Cook County), 100 I11. App. 2d 108, 114,
241 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1st Dist. 1968).
204. See Murphy v. A.H. Lueckt & Co., 379 I11. 227, 234, 40 N.E.2d 69, 73 (1942); Lusk v.
Community Consol. School Dist. No. 95 (Lake County), 20 I11. App. 2d 252, 257, 155 N.E.2d
650, 653 (2d Dist. 1959); Murphy v. Houston, 250 111. App. 385, 394 (1st Dist. 1928).
205. Werner v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 4 (Marshall County), 40 I11. App. 2d 491,
498, 190 N.E.2d 184, 187 (2d Dist. 1963).
206. Rolando v. School Directors (Dist. No. 125, LaSalle County), 44 II1. App. 3d 658, 661,
358 N.E.2d 945, 947 (3d Dist. 1976). See Kupkowski v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs,
(Downers Grove), 71 Ill. App. 3d 316, 323, 389 N.E.2d 219, 224 (2d Dist. 1979); Carrao v.
Board of Educ. (Chicago), 46 II1. App. 3d 33, 40, 360 N.E.2d 536, 542 (1st Dist. 1977).
207. Rolando v. School Directors, 44 I11. App. 3d at 661, 358 N.E.2d at 947. See Crepps v.
Industrial Comm'n, 402 I11. 606, 85 N.E.2d 5 (1949).
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to prove that a teacher acted in a deficient manner. 208 In Gilliland v.
Board of Education, 209 the supreme court relied favorably upon expert tes-
timony to find the causes for dismissal irremediable. Courts also have given
weight to other evidence including similar behavior by other teachers,
2 10
the presence or absence of complaints, testimony by other teachers, parents,
and students, 211 and whether the dismissed teacher took the stand to deny
the charges. 212 In addition, courts have taken judicial notice of conditions
in a school that may contribute to a teacher's lack of classroom control.
2 13
Evaluations conducted to determine whether or not an individual teacher
is competent are a source of evidence to which Illinois courts have given
little attention. Although neither section 24-11 nor section 24-12 require an
evaluation to help a board determine whether or not to extend a teacher's
probation or to dismiss a teacher, 2 14 evaluations can provide direct evidence
208. Allione v. Board of Educ. (South Fork Dist. No. 310), 29 I11. App. 2d 261, 265-66, 173
N.E.2d 13, 16 (3d Dist. 1961); Lusk v. Community Consol. School Dist. No. 95, 20 I11. App. 2d
at 258, 155 N.E.2d at 654. See Werner v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 4, 40 III. App. 2d
at 496, 190 N.E.2d at 186 (court did not rule the hearsay evidence sufficient nor insufficient,
but, in reversing the dismissal, noted that the Board made every effort to give the plaintiff a fair
hearing).
209. 67 I11. 2d 143, 154, 365 N.E.2d 322, 325-26 (1977). In Fowler v. Young, 77 Ohio App.
20, 30, 65 N.E.2d 399, 404 (1945), the court supported the use of expert testimony when it
asserted that "[tlhe ordinary layman is not versed in that art, neither is he in a position to
measure the necessary qualifications required for the teacher of today. In our judgment this
information can be properly imparted by one who is versed in the profession and aware of the
qualifications required." Id.
210. See Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 IlL 2d at 439, 367 N.E.2d at 1338-39.
211. In Kallas v. Board of Educ., 15 111. App. 3d at 452, 304 N.E.2d at 528, the court
affirmed a dismissal, noting that the testimony was "replete with complaints." In Miller v.
Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 132, Cook County), 51 111. App. 2d 20, 31, 200 N.E.2d 838, 843 (1st
Dist. 1964), the court noted that the students "were unanimous in their testimony that the
plaintiff did a good job as a teacher and that they had not heard him swear, nor seen him strike
a student." Similarly, in Hutchison v. Board of Educ. (Greenfield Dist. No. 10), 32 Ill. App. 2d
247, 254, 177 N.E.2d 420, 425 (3d Dist. 1961), the court reversed a dismissal, noting that
students testified that they "learned something" and were "satisfied with" the teacher. And, in
Pearson v. Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 5, Macoupin County), 12 I11. App. 2d 44, 51-52, 138
N.E.2d 326, 330 (3d Dist. 1956), the court found persuasive teacher and student testimony that
the teacher was emotional and nervous.
212. See, e.g., Kallas v. Board of Educ., 15 I11. App. 3d at 452, 304 N.E.2d at 529. The
Kallas court affirmed the dismissal, noting that "[tlhe teacher did not take the stand to deny any
of the events testified to." Id. See Chandler v. East St. Louis School Dist. 189, 35 III. App. 2d
at 320, 182 N.E.2d at 776-77 (teacher did deny the charges, and the court reversed the dismis-
sal).
213. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 111. App. 2d at 33, 200 N.E.2d at 844. In Miller,
the court stated: "In order for a teacher to function properly there must be some way of imple-
menting the requirement that students behave in an orderly and respectful manner. That in
many cases students do not so behave is common knowledge." Id.
214. ILL. lEv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-11, -12 (1977). See Jackson v. Board of Educ. (Trico
Dist. No. 176), 63 Ill. App. 3d 671, 675, 380 N.E.2d 41, 44 (5th Dist. 1978). In Jackson, the
court found "no requirement . . . that a formal evaluation be performed" pursuant to a board's
denial of tenure under section 24-11 of the School Code. Id.
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of competency. Evaluations are especially pertinent when prepared by
skilled professionals who observe a teacher in his or her classroom. 2 15 Only
with such evidence can a board fully and accurately determine a teacher's
competence. Charges should not result from rumors or unsubstantiated
complaints but from actual visits to a classroom.2 1 6
If evaluations are to be proper evidentiary tools, however, both their rele-
vance and bias component must be carefully scrutinized. First, the evidence
provided by evaluations should be material and relevant; the evidence
should help prove whether a teacher's conduct was irremediable, not re-
mediated after a warning notice, or remediable. As an example, only evalua-
tions between the time of a teacher's receipt of a warning notice and a
board's decision to dismiss a teacher would be relevant to show that a
teacher did not correct deficiencies in a warning notice. Evaluations before a
warning notice was received or after a teacher was dismissed would be ir-
relevant for this purpose.
In addition, evaluations extending many years back in time may or may
not be relevant. For example, where a teacher is evaluated once a year over
a period of years and the same deficiency appears, a hearing officer or court
may not know whether the conduct was cumulative and continuous 2 17 or
merely isolated. 218 Nevertheless, a board can use such evaluations to dem-
onstrate a teacher's inability to correct deficient conduct. 219 Conversely,
depending upon the particular facts, a teacher can point to these evaluations
to support a charge that the board sat idly by, allowing an originally remedi-
able charge to become irremediable. 220
Second, because dismissal is the most severe penalty a school board can
impose, and because dismissal can effectively end a professional career, 221
evaluations should be based on objective criteria established by officially an-
nounced, uniformly applied board policy. 222 These criteria should include
facts about the surrounding circumstances, e.g., the type of students in the
215. See BE.AUCHAMP, supra note 87, at 170. The author asserts that the process of evalua-
tion is difficult and that evaluators have limited experience. Beauchamp defines curriculum
evaluation as consisting of "those processes necessary to judge the effectiveness of the cur-
riculum that was planned as well as the effectiveness of the curriculum system itself," id. at 204,
which includes the implementation of a curriculum by teachers. In SAYLOR & ALEXANDER,
supra note 10, at 302, the authors define evaluation as the " 'collection and use of information
to make decisions about an educational program.' " id., quoting Cronback, Course Improvement
through Evaluation, 64 TCHRS. C. REc. 672 (1963). According to Saylor and Alexander, evalua-
tions help teachers and other school decision-makers make the best choices of curriculum con-
tent, instructional objectives and methods, and evaluation techniques. Id. at 298.
216. Hutchison v. Board of Educ., 32 I11. App. 2d at 254, 177 N.E.2d at 424.
217. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
218. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 50, 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
220. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
221. Board of Educ. (Crete-Monee Dist. No. 201-U) v. Angelotti, at 40 (Nov. 9, 1976) (El-
son, H.O.).
222. Id. at 41.
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classroom and the teacher's entire curriculum planning and implementa-
tion. 223 The fact that some students are difficult 2 24 or have unusual be-
havior problems 22 5 may mitigate a board's charge of incompetency.
Likewise, hearing officers and courts should consider a teacher's total in-
structional program. In Gilliland, the supreme court noted with approval a
three-day evaluation period that presented a complete picture of the
teacher's ability and planning. 226 In contrast, the supreme court examined
other evaluations and observed that the evaluator did not know whether the
teacher had prepared lesson plans for the class. 227 Without such informa-
tion, the court reversed the dismissal, noting that the board could not prop-
erly dismiss the teacher for lack of proper planning. 228 An appellate district
agreed with this reasoning and reversed the dismissal of a teacher because
the superintendent "didn't know if [the teacher had] followed his sugges-
tion." 229  With knowledge of the teacher's activities before and after the
time of the evaluation, a school board will be able to show that its decision
to dismiss a teacher was not arbitrary but instead was based on solid and
valid evidence.
Third, the usefulness of an evaluation is necessarily affected by an
evaluator's degree of expertise or possible bias. An evaluator must possess
sufficient expertise properly to evaluate a teacher. 230 An evaluator should
have knowledge about evaluation techniques and should understand the cur-
riculum area taught by the teacher. For example, an evaluator knowl-
edgeable about home economics should evaluate a home economics teacher.
Similarly, an evaluator familiar with the goals and objectives of special edu-
cation should evaluate teachers of students with learning disabilities. In
other words, a teacher should be evaluated by teachers, administrators, or
others who are aware of the goals and objectives of the specific course or
educational program, who have specific knowledge of the problems, level of
educational ability, and psychological profiles of the students in the class-
room, and who may have had direct experience teaching the same course
content. 231
Illustrative of this lack-of-knowledge problem was a case in which an eval-
uator complained that the kindergarten students took eight minutes to recite
the pledge of allegiance. 232  The hearing officer, in reversing the dismissal,
223. SAYLOR & ALEXANDER, supra note 10, at 333-36.
224. Granite City Community Unit School Dist. No. 9 v. Lakin, at 4 (Aug. 25, 1976) (Adel-
man, H.O.).
225. Miller v. Board of Educ., 51 Il. App. 2d at 36, 200 N.E.2d at 846.
226. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 11. 2d at 151, 365 N.E.2d at 325.
227. Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 Ill. 2d at 438, 367 N.E.2d at 1339.
228. Id. at 443, 367 N.E.2d at 1341.
229. Yesinowski v. Board of Educ. (Byron Dist. No. 226), 28 111. App. 3d 119, 124, 328
N.E.2d 23, 27 (2d Dist. 1975).
230. Brief for Defendant at 27, Board of Educ. (Dist. No. 131) v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.,
No. 79-29 (2d Dist. Nov. 20, 1978).
231. 1d. at 29.
232. Tremont Community Unit School Dist. 702 v. Shannon, at 22 (Oct. 6, 1977) (Urban,
H.O.).
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aptly asserted that the evaluator could not understand why this activity took
so long because he was not familiar with how kindergarten classes were con-
ducted. 233 Similar problems can arise in a special education department.
An evaluator unaware and unskilled in the special educational and emotional
problems of such students will find much about which to complain. 234 As a
result of these inadequacies, evaluators lacking sufficient expertise and
awareness of the specific nature and content of the instructional process can
only collect meaningless evidence.
Further, evaluators should not be biased, arbitrary, capricious, or prej-
udiced.2 35 For example, a principal has "an interest in the outcome"
of a case should not be the "only person directly involved in evaluating" the
teacher. 236 Similarly, a principal should not taint an evaluator's remarks by
communicating the superintendent's "concern" about the teacher. 237 Such
statements can only create biased preconceptions and are especially damag-
ing where the evaluators visit the teacher's classroom only one or two times
to determine whether he or she has corrected allegedly deficient conduct.2 "3
In summary, the best evidence is evidence carefully and routinely
gathered in conformity with procedures established by agreement between
teachers, administrators, and school boards. The evidence should uphold or
rebut a charge of irremediability. More importantly, however, the evidence
should include information detailing all of the surrounding circumstances
and mitigating factors, as well as any other pertinent information about the
teacher, the students, and the administration. Only in this way can specific
conduct by a teacher be adequately evaluated by hearing officers and courts
in light of the total context of the educational environment.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Comment has set forth the current standards that courts and hearing
officers utilize to determine whether a teacher's dismissal should be affirmed
or reversed. It has examined the general tests for determining irremediabil-
ity, described and categorized improper teacher conduct, and suggested
both general standards and specific factors that bearing officers and courts
should consider in future proceedings. Together, these standards and factors
constitute a surrounding-circumstances test whereby hearing officers and
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Board of Educ. (Aurora Dist. No. 131), v. Murray (Sept. 16, 1977) (Meserow,
H.O.), rev'd, No. 77 MR 10546 (Kane County Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 1978), appeal docketed, No.
79-29 (2d Dist. Nov. 20, 1978).
235. Homewood-Flossmoor School Dist. No. 233 (Cook County) v. Divila, at 23 (Jan. 17,
1978) (Dolnick, H.O.).
236. Board of Educ. v. Angelotti, at 53 (Nov. 9, 1976) (Elson, H.O.).
237. Brief for Defendant at 30, Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., No. 79-29 (2d
Dist. Nov. 20, 1978). See note 234 and accompanying text supra.
238. Brief for Defendant at 31, Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., No. 79-29 (2d
Dist. Nov. 20, 1978).
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courts consider alleged misconduct in relation to a teacher's working envi-
ronment. The development and expansion of this test by Illinois hearing
officers and courts would be a recognition of the dynamic nature of the
teaching and educational setting. Absent widespread application of private
sector labor law tests, hearing officers and courts cannot realistically and
equitably review dismissals.
Because the characterization of a teacher's conduct as remediable or ir-
remediable pervades the entire question of a teachei's dismissal, Illinois
hearing officers and courts should further clarify the tests of irremediability.
Courts need to define the parameters of damage and correctability, espe-
cially in light of the supreme court's recent requirement that the damage
sustained by students, faculty, or school be severe. 23 9 Second, courts
should resolve the confusion and furnish guidelines regarding the length of
time necessary for a remediable cause to become irremediable. Current case
law indicates that it is somewhere over one year 240 but less than four
years, 241 however, it may be as much as several years. 242 Third, courts
need to explain exactly how remediable causes become irremediable when a
school board sits idly by, 2 43 and how remediable causes, in combination, can
be considered irremediable. 244 Courts must also determine how school
boards should estimate the length of the required period of remediation after
a notice of remedy is served on a teacher, and they must formulate clear
standards for the type of evidence that best establishes the existence of al-
leged deficient conduct. Finally, courts should start to apply the well-
reasoned tests formulated by hearing officers, who have the direct expertise
in both labor and school law. All of the above issues require courts to adopt
an active role whereby they will be forced to apply the currently vague and
undefined tests to expanded sets of facts on a case-by-case basis. The courts,
however, lack clearly-drawn, objective criteria on which to base a decision,
criteria that can be provided by the Illinois General Assembly.
The General Assembly can start this process by amending sections 10-
22.4, 24-12, and 34-85 to reflect the current status of the law. First, the
General Assembly should repeal the power of a school board to dismiss a
teacher "whenever, in its opinion, [the teacher] is not qualified to teach, or
whenever .. . the interests of the schools require it." 245 These provisions
should be repealed because they are vague, overly broad, and, in many
cases, they merely repeat causes for dismissal already alleged.
24 6
239. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 II. 2d 314, 322, 388 N.E.2d 398, 405 (1979). See note 54
and accompanying text supra.
240. Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 Ill. 2d at 333, 388 N.E.2d at 406. See note 60 and
accompanying text supra.
241. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 67 Ill. 2d 143, 154, 365 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1977). See note
61 and accompanying text supra.
242. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
243. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
244. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
245. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1977). See note 7 supra.
246. See notes 167, 173, 185 and accompanying text supra.
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A more difficult legislative task involves sections 24-12 and 34-85. The
General Assembly should amend these sections to state that causes may be
either remediable or irremediable and that due process requirements may or
may not be required in either contingency. Next, the General Assembly
needs to determine whether the judicial standards for irremediability should
be statutorily mandated or whether other standards should be used by
school boards, hearing officers, and courts. If, however, any standards are
promulgated, they should be general guidelines 247 that would allow local
school boards, hearing officers, and courts maximum freedom to consider
carefully the particular facts of each case. General guidelines would also
allow practitioners for school boards and teachers the opportunity to make
important distinctions based on the facts of each case, distinctions that can
make the difference between affirming and reversing a dismissal.
Finally, and most importantly, individual school boards and teachers must
take an active role in this area of the law. School board members must
become fully aware of their responsibility to decide fairly the professional
futures of their employees. Board members must do what they consider to
be best for the community they serve and provide checks on administrators
to ensure meaningful decision-making. Teachers, too, must become aware of
the dismissal process in general. Specifically, they should learn the types of
conduct that: can lead to a warning notice or dismissal based upon irremedi-
able causes. In addition, both school boards and teachers should develop and
implement consistent and workable systems for the collection of evidence to
be used in the dismissal process. With these first steps by those directly
involved in the dismissal process, as well as by hearing officers, courts, and
the General Assembly, Illinois can have a less complex and more equitable
system of teacher dismissal.
Alan M. Kaplan*
247. The need for general guidelines, and the problems associated with enacting legislation
that mandates many specific obligations for local school boards can be clearly seen in the area of
curriculum prescriptions. See A. Kaplan, Curriculum Inputs: An Analysis of State Legislation
Affecting the Public School Curriculum (Sept. 1, 1974) (unpublished master's thesis, Northwest-
ern University), in which, as of December 31, 1973, 118 separate curriculum prescriptions were
found to be in force for all regular programs in the public primary and secondary schools in
Illinois. These 118 prescriptions were divided into four groups for analysis: programs (for exam-
ple, industrial arts); courses (automobile maintenance); subjects (engine maintenance); and con-
tent (pistons).
Courts have consistently allowed state legislatures to promulgate such burdensome and direc-
tive statutes. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Powell v. Board of Educ., 97 Ill. 375 (1881); State Tax Comm'r v. Board of Educ.
(Holton), 146 Kan. 722, 73 P.2d 49 (1937); Ehret v. Kulpmont Borough School Dist., 333 Pa.
518, 5 A.2d 188 (1939).
See generally R. HAMILTON & P. MORT, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 6 (1941); G. WIGGIN,
EDUCATION AND NATIONALISM 244 (1962); Redford, Some Arguments Against Curriculum Mak-
ing By a Legislative Body, 30 CAL. J. OF SECONDARY EDUC. 2 (Feb. 1955).
* The author wishes to acknowledge the inspiration and cooperation of Mr. Wayne A.
Schwartzman, of the Chicago firm of Hirsh and Schwartzman.
1980]

